Is it transformative or not? The characteristics of private equity investors’ acquisition planning by Soini, Veera
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IS IT TRANSFORMATIVE OR NOT?  
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE EQUITY 
INVESTORS’ ACQUISITION PLANNING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Master’s Thesis 
Veera Soini 
Aalto University School of Business 
Management and International 
Business 
Fall 2018 
 
 Aalto University, P.O. BOX 11000, 00076 
AALTO 
www.aalto.fi 
Abstract of master’s thesis 
 
 i  
 
 
Author  Veera Soini  
Title of thesis Is it transformative or not? The characteristics of private equity 
investors’ acquisition planning 
Degree  Master of Science in Economics and Business Administration 
Degree programme  Management and International Business      
Thesis advisor(s)  Perttu Kähäri 
Year of approval  2018 Number of pages  99  Language  English 
Abstract 
The acquisitions by private equity backed companies are increasingly popular, in both 
practice and academic research. The academic literature on the topic is emerging in the 
field of finance, focusing on topics such as probability of acquisitions and the 
acquisitions’ effects on performance by using quantitative methods. However, the 
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Pääomasijoittajien kohdeyritysten yritysostot ovat kasvavassa määrin suosittuja niin 
käytännössä kuin akateemisessa tutkimuksessakin. Aikaisempi tutkimus on pääasiassa 
tehty rahoituksen alalla. Tutkimukset ovat keskittyneet tutkien muun muassa 
yritysostojen todennäköisyyksiä ja niiden vaikutuksia kohdeyrityksestä saatavaan 
tulokseen, käyttäen pääasiassa määrällisen tutkimuksen keinoja. Tutkimuksesta 
nykyisellään kuitenkin puuttuu ymmärrys siitä, miten pääomasijoittajat käyttävät 
yritysostoja kohdeyrityksissään laadullisesta näkökulmasta. 
 
Tämä tutkimus osallistuu tähän keskusteluun tutkimalla, miten pääomasijoittajat 
suunnittelevat yritysostot kokonaisuutena kohdeyrityksissään ja miten potentiaalisesti 
korkeat yritysostomäärät johdetaan. Aiheen ymmärtämiseksi tutkimuksen teoreettinen 
kehys muodostuu pääomasijoittamiseen liittyvän kirjallisuuden lisäksi yritysostojen 
suunnitteluun liittyvästä kirjallisuudesta. 
 
Tutkimus toteutetaan monitapaustutkimuksena, jossa viisi eri tapausta edustaa 
viittä eri kohdeyritystä, joihin pääomasijoittaja on sijoittanut tai sijoittaa edelleen. 
Tutkimuksen aineisto on kerätty avoimin haastatteluin, jossa haastateltavina ovat 
kyseisten kohdeyritysten pääomasijoittajat. Aineistoa on täydennetty myös julkisesti 
saatavista lähteistä ja tietokannoista. 
 
Tutkimustuloksista näkyy, että pääomasijoittajat ovat pääasiassa strategisia 
yritysostojen suunnittelijoita. Pääomasijoittajien osallistuminen yritysostoihin 
vaihtelee käytännön työstä valvovaan rooliin riippuen siitä, kuinka kokenut kohdeyritys 
on yritysostojen tekemisessä. Pääomasijoittajat eivät myöskään pitäneet kaikki 
yritysostoja samanarvoisina, vaan jako uudistavien ja vähemmän uudistavien 
yritysostojen välillä oli selkeä. Pääomasijoittajien rooli myös vaihteli riippuen tästä 
jaottelusta: uudistavissa yritysostoissa pääomasijoittajat olivat aktiivisesti mukana 
käytännön työssä, kun taas vähemmän uudistavien yritysostojen toteuttaminen jäi 
usein kohdeyritykselle. 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Since its emergence as an important phenomenon in the 1980’s (Kaplan & Strömberg, 
2009), private equity and private equity firms have become significant participants in 
the market for corporate control (Wruck, 2008). Well-known firms such as the Danish 
facility services company ISS, the American pet supply company Petco, and the Finnish 
textile-maker Finlayson & Co have had private equity backing during their journeys. 
Moreover, there are numerous other ones: private equity firms completed, according to 
a study by Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), approximately 17 700 buyout transactions in 
total between January 1970 and June 2007. Private equity is also affected by boom and 
bust cycles (Wruck, 2008), and the figures presented by Kaplan & Strömberg do not 
show the effects of economic distress observed from 2007 onwards (Wruck, 2008). 
 
Despite the effects of the latest bust cycle, private equity firms are prominent 
players in the Finnish economy. According to Pääomasijoittajat - Finnish Venture 
Capital Association (2018), 56% of the new companies listed in the Nasdaq Helsinki 
between 2015 and 2017 had private equity backing (buyout or venture capital), either at 
the time of the IPO or at an earlier stage. This shows that, even though sometimes the 
private equity investors tend to operate “behind the scenes” and out of the view of the 
end customers of their portfolio firms, they affect a significant amount of companies. 
The presence of the private equity makes it an interesting area for research. 
 
Private equity firms are reported to generate substantial returns; outperforming 
public markets such as S&P500 (see e.g. Harris et al., 2014). The performance of 
private equity is often contributed to the active style of investing the private equity 
investors tend to adopt in their investments, i.e. in their portfolio firms (see e.g. Wood 
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& Wright, 2009, Metrick & Yasuda, 2011). The active participation allows for the use 
of different value creation drivers, which increasingly also include the use of mergers 
and acquisitions as an instrument to grow the portfolio firms (Birgl et al. 2016). 
 
The success of mergers and acquisitions in general is quite low. Depending on the 
source, researchers offer a failure rates between 70% and 90% (Christensen et al., 
2011). The large failure rates are contributed to, for example, the complexity of 
acquisitions (see e.g. Gomes et al., 2013). Considering the difficulties with acquisitions, 
the private equity firms’ ability to generate significant returns with the generally poor 
success rate of mergers and acquisitions creates an interesting paradox. Do the private 
equity firms generate the results despite the failing acquisitions? Or, are they able to 
evade the failures and somehow execute more of the successful acquisitions? If the 
acquisitions performed by the private equity backed companies were to fail in 
approximately 80% of the cases, would not the private equity firms avoid them instead 
of actively using them? How do private equity firms influence their portfolio firms’ 
mergers and acquisitions? By examining the portfolio firms’ M&A activity, and the 
ways the private equity investors plan it, it is possible to better understand how the 
mergers and acquisitions are used in the context of private equity. 
 
To answer this call, this thesis explores the private equity investors’ influence on 
the portfolio firms’ acquisitions, from the perspective of planning. This is done by 
applying the qualitative methodology of a case study, where five portfolio firms are 
chosen as the cases and thus form the basis of this multiple case study. Their respective 
private equity investors were interviewed to understand how they see the use 
acquisitions in their portfolio firms. As a result, the thesis presents an overview and 
discussion of the characteristics of private equity investors’ acquisition planning, as 
well as of the roles they adopt in the acquisition planning and execution.  
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1.2 Research Gap and Research Questions 
 
Although the use of mergers and acquisitions in the portfolio firms has gained its 
foothold in the practice of private equity firms, the academic literature on the topic is 
still budding (see e.g. Morkötter & Wetzer, 2015, and Hammer et al., 2016). It is 
finding its way to the mainstream finance literature through the first published articles 
and working papers, in addition to more practice-oriented reports co-authored with 
corporate partners. The number of researchers and authors on the topic is still quite 
limited, and the main contributions arise from a handful of authors who are mainly 
Germany-based, such as Benjamin Hammer and Heiko Hinrichs. In these papers, the 
focus has been mainly to understand the likelihood and the performance implications of 
the acquisitions made by the portfolio firms, from a finance-oriented viewpoint. 
Understanding on how the acquisitions are managed, however, is still widely missing 
from this emerging research field. There is little research available on, for example, 
what motivates the acquisitions or how the acquisitions are managed or planned from 
the perspective of the private equity investor. The research shows that private equity 
investors tend to use many acquisitions (see e.g. Hammer et al., 2016, Brigl et al.,2016), 
but the research does not answer how these acquisitions are executed in practice.  
 
Considering that the topic of acquisitions made by the portfolio firms is still new 
in the field of finance, in the academic strategy and management literature the topic is 
still widely ignored. The strategy and management literature is, however, rich with 
topics relating to mergers and acquisitions, with a great spectrum of areas varying from, 
for example, learning from acquisitions to integration management. The field also holds 
research related to private equity, for example on topics such as the strategic benefits of 
private equity (see e.g. Folta & Janney, 2004). However, even in the management and 
strategy literature these two areas have not been widely studied together. 
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Combining the two, private equity and management, disciplines of academic 
research allows for a more holistic understanding on the topic of private equity portfolio 
firms and mergers and acquisitions. In addition to the finance-oriented quantitative 
studies, the perspective of strategy and management could bring insight into, for 
example, how these acquisitions are managed, what motivates the acquisitions, and 
what is the role of private equity firms compared to the portfolio firms. Doing this kind 
of research would potentially also offer a variety of new directions for the future 
studies, helping the field grow. If the field is not refreshed with management-oriented 
research, it runs the risk of becoming a narrow one where the financial determinants are 
the basis for the findings.  
 
In addition to the potentially impactful benefits to the academic fields, there are 
benefits to the practitioners as well. By better understanding the acquisitions performed 
by the private equity portfolio firms, from the perspective of acquisition management, 
research can possibly give insight to the managers of those companies that are seeking 
or planning to seek private equity backing. When assessing their options, they would 
benefit from better understanding on the ways the private equity firms operate, and how 
they handle mergers and acquisitions.  
 
As illustrated above, the current academic knowledge on the ways private equity 
investors influence and manage the acquisition decisions and the acquisition execution 
is still quite limited. That notion forms the basis of this study. The goal of this study is 
to understand how the private equity investors plan the acquisition activity of their 
portfolio firms for the whole investment period. From that, the research question is 
formulated in the following way: 
 
How do the private equity investors plan the overall acquisition behavior of their 
portfolio firms? 
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The aim is to understand the characteristics of acquisition planning in the portfolio 
firms, especially from the perspective of the private equity investor. The theoretical 
basis for this research question arises from the literature related to M&A process, with a 
focus especially on the pre-combination phase of the process, i.e. the M&A planning. 
Although looking at the whole process could be beneficial, for the purposes of this 
thesis the scope is narrowed down to planning. Private equity firms are, after all, owners 
in the businesses they invest in, instead of, for example, being managers of the firms or 
outside consultants. Thus, taking into consideration the general role of an owner, it 
seems appropriate to assume that for the most part, the influence is stronger in the 
beginning where, for example, the strategic direction and goals play a bigger part and 
the work is not solely hands-on. To understand the uniqueness of the private equity 
model in this respective, the M&A literature is combined with literature on private 
equity, including the overall characteristics and goals of private equity investors. This 
also includes the ways private equity investors are active in their investments and the 
different forms of governance that they bring to the portfolio firms. With the help of the 
two streams of literature, the empirical data is analyzed to shed light into what kind of 
planners the private equity investors are and what kinds of roles they may hold during 
the process.  
 
The empirical part is conducted as a qualitative multiple case study. The cases 
represent different portfolio firms that have recently been exited or are currently 
invested in by a private equity firm. The data are collected through loosely structured 
interviews, held during spring, summer, and fall 2018. The interviewees consist of 
private equity investors for the cases. The collected data is analyses first as a within-
case analysis and then as cross-case analysis. 
 
The thesis is structured in the following way. After the introduction begins the 
literature review. It is divided into two separate chapters: private equity and mergers and 
acquisitions. Chapter 2 focuses on the private equity side: first the characteristics of 
private equity are considered, followed with a review of the current understanding on 
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the use of acquisitions in the private equity setting. This chapter sets the scene for the 
study, helping to grasp the uniqueness of the context in private equity. The second 
chapter of literature review (Chapter 3) is dedicated to literature on M&A planning, 
introducing more strategy and management-oriented research to complement the private 
equity literature. This part of the literature review sheds light on the different types of 
planning and their characteristics to help describe the M&A planning later on in the 
findings. The two literature review chapters are followed by a short chapter on the 
theoretical framework in Chapter 4. This framework synthesizes the two chapters on 
relevant literature and offers assumptions based on the previous research. These 
assumptions form the structure for the analysis of the empirical findings and discussion.  
     
Research design and methodology are presented in Chapter 5. Here the specifics 
of the conducted study are described, including justification, sampling decisions, data 
collection, analysis methods, and evaluation of the chosen method. The chapter 
describes empirical part of the thesis to aid in understanding the following chapters: the 
empirical findings in Chapter 6 and the discussion in Chapter 7. Chapter 6 starts with 
within case analysis of the cases used in the study, followed by the cross-case analysis. 
The findings of the cross-case analysis are structured according to the theoretical 
framework. In the discussion in Chapter 7, the findings of the study are brought together 
with the perspectives of the literature review to explore the contributions of the study. 
The last chapter (Chapter 8) holds the conclusions, it brings the study together to answer 
the above described research question, as well as discusses the implications of the study. 
In addition, the conclusions chapter offer areas for future research and visits the 
limitations of this study. 
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1.3 Definitions of the Key Terms 
 
There are two key terms used across the thesis. Their definitions are the following: 
 
Private Equity is used as a synonym for buyouts, thus focusing on more mature 
firms where the private equity funds acquire a controlling majority, leaving out early-
stage venture capital. This seems to be the convention that majority authors accept in 
the literature on private equity, including those authors who write about the acquisitions 
performed by private equity backed portfolio firms. (More detailed description of what 
private equity is and how it works in Chapter 2) 
 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) is used as an overall term for the two types of 
activity where the ownership of a company is transferred to another company, without 
specific distinction between the two. This because, in this thesis, it is not as important to 
pinpoint where the target company ends up in the acquiring company, but to understand 
what preceded the decision to engage in buying existing companies. In addition, the 
term acquisition is also used as a synonym for mergers and acquisitions. (More detailed 
description of mergers and acquisitions in Chapter 3) 
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2 Private Equity 
 
This chapter is the first chapter out of the two chapters in the literature review. Together 
they form the theoretical backbone of this thesis. This chapter will focus on private 
equity, exploring it to guide in understanding the uniqueness of private equity. Firstly, 
the general idea and characteristics of private equity are discussed; how private equity 
firms operate, what do they do, and what makes them different compared to other 
investment forms. In the second section, the focus shifts to value creation and the role of 
acquisitions in private equity to understand the ways private equity investors shape their 
portfolio firms.  
 
Private equity as a term can be seen to consist of one or several aspects, 
depending on the author. For some, private equity is an umbrella term that broadly 
includes the investments in unquoted companies, no matter what stage the company is 
in (see e.g. Wood & Wright, 2009). In this definition, private equity includes venture 
capital that invests in early-stage firms (e.g. start-ups), where the investments do not 
typically gain a majority control (see e.g. Metrick & Yasuda, 2011, Kaplan & 
Strömberg, 2009). In addition, according to this view, private equity is seen to include 
buyout transactions, which invest in mature or existing firms and tend to obtain a 
majority control (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). The term private equity can also include 
other investment types, such as mezzanine and distress investments (Metrick & Yasuda, 
2011). However, according to an alternative definition, private equity can be seen to 
include only buyouts, thus those firms that engage in buyouts are referred to as private 
equity firms (see e.g. Moon, 2006, Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). For the purposes of this 
study, the thesis adapts the Kaplan and Strömberg’s (2009) terminology where private 
equity is used as a synonym for buyouts, thus focusing on more mature firms with 
controlling majority, leaving out early-stage venture capital.  
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2.1 Characteristics of Private Equity 
 
Private equity firms raise their funds from institutional investors, such as pension funds 
and endowments (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011), and wealthy individuals (Barber & Goold, 
2007). The financial values of the private equity funds are not marked to market, and 
the returns from the funds are not realized until the fund is at the end of its lifetime, 
which is usually after approximately ten years (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011). The raised 
funds are invested in buying and selling companies, i.e. the portfolio firms (Barber & 
Goold, 2007). Private equity funds differ from other forms of investment, such as 
mutual funds and hedge funds, in that they invest in private, illiquid companies of 
which there is often scarcely information available (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011).  
 
Private equity funds also differ from corporations and strategic investments made 
by corporations as private equity funds are required to return the invested money back 
to the investors after the set time period (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011). The private equity 
firms’ practice of buying companies only to sell them after a fairly short time and 
intense improvement is quite different from the practice of corporations who tend to buy 
companies to hold them (Barber & Goold, 2007). The companies acquired by private 
equity funds are not typically integrated anywhere nor they are not exactly synergistic to 
the private equity firms although they can create benefits to the other portfolio firms 
held by the private equity firm (Barber & Goold, 2007). Corporations, however, tend to 
be more strategic acquirers who integrate the acquired companies to realize benefits 
from them (Barber & Goold, 2017). 
 
In addition to acquiring private companies, private equity firms may also acquire 
divisions of larger groups (Castellaneta & Gottschalg, 2016). In some cases, private 
equity firms take public companies private; delisting them, but even then the company 
is not typically public during the investment period (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011, 
Castellaneta & Gottschalg, 2016). The investment period of the portfolio firms seems to 
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be, on average, somewhere between four years (Lopez-de-Silanes et al., 2015) and six 
years (Mäkiaho & Torstila, 2017). There is a pressure on the private equity investors to 
find portfolio firms that have clear paths to exits (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011) as the 
investment period usually cannot be longer than the fund’s lifetime (approx. 10 years). 
In addition to the requirement of an exit, private equity investors also tend to focus on 
financial returns (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011). According to Gompers and colleagues 
(2016), the main drivers of financial returns, as reported by the private equity investors 
themselves, are the growth of the value of the business, the improvement of operations 
in the company, and leverage. 
 
The pursuit for returns is founded on active participation in the portfolio firms. 
Private equity investors can be active in different ways: for example, private equity 
investors seek representation in the boards of their portfolio firms, through which they 
can influence the actions taken by the firm (Barber & Goold, 2007). Other means for 
influence are restrictions on the management’s behavior (e.g. reporting requirements) 
(Wood & Wright, 2009), veto rights, and contingent control rights (Metrick & Yasuda, 
2011). All of these can mean radical changes to the governance of the firm (Wood & 
Wright, 2009). In addition to these control levers, the private equity investors can 
contribute missing or complementary skills to the portfolio firms and their management 
teams (Moon, 2006). Although being active, traditionally the private equity investors 
offer advice and stay close to the management but tend to keep away from the day-to-
day activities (Barber & Goold, 2007).  
 
There are generally three ways a private equity firm can exit a portfolio firm: 
through a sale of the company to an industrial or strategic buyer (i.e. acquisition by a 
company), through a sale to another private equity fund (i.e. secondary buyout), and 
through an IPO of the company where the shares held by the private equity firm can 
subsequently be sold in the public market (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011). In their 
longitudinal study spanning the years from 1970 to 2007, Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) 
tracked the popularity of the different exit options. Globally compared, the most popular 
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channel for exit during that period was the sale to a strategic buyer (38%), the second 
most popular exit was secondary buyout by another private equity firm (24%), and the 
third was an IPO (14 %). Compared to a similar statistic by Pääomasijoittajat - Finnish 
Venture Capital Association (2018), in Finland in 2017, IPO (and sale of quoted shares) 
was by far the most popular exit in Finland (over 40%), while a sale to a strategic buyer 
and a secondary buyout were smaller, but equally popular. It is worth mentioning that 
these three, although the most popular, are not the only ways to exit a portfolio firm. 
Other ways include a sale to the management, a sale to a LBO-backed firm, and a 
bankruptcy (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009).  
 
2.2 Value Creation in Private Equity 
 
There is a need for diverse means of value creation for private equity firms, as merely 
buying portfolio firms to hold them is no longer a viable value creation source 
(Morkötter & Wetzer, 2016). This is visible in the responses given by the private equity 
investors in a study by Gompers and colleagues (2016): the ability to create value was 
the third most important factor in choosing a portfolio firm, after the business model or 
competitive position, and the management team. The ways to create value in private 
equity are divided into three categories by Achleitner and Figge (2014): 1. Operational 
performance improvements, 2. Leverage effect, and 3. Pricing. The chosen mix of these 
value creation drivers depends on the portfolio company itself, but also on the private 
equity firm as different equity firms tend to emphasize different value drivers (Gompers 
et al., 2016).  
 
Out of these three drivers of value creation, operational performance 
improvements is a key driver (see e.g. Guo et al., 2011). According to a study by 
Achleitner and colleagues (2010) operational and market effects are the largest source 
of value creation, contributing to two thirds of created value. Operational performance 
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improvements consist of two aspects: of increasing the cash flow of the company as 
well as of streamlining the capital structure (Achleitner & Figge, 2014). The top-line 
growth can be achieved with, for example, geographical expansion, development of new 
products and services, improved sales force effectiveness, or enhanced price realization 
(Birgl et al., 2012). On the other hand, costs can be cut by reducing the cost related to 
operating, and by decreasing the selling, administrative, and general expenses (Birgl et 
al., 2012). A study by Gompers and colleagues (2016) suggests that out of the two, the 
growth is more important to the private equity investors than the reduction of costs.  
 
 Private equity investors can grow their portfolio firms through organic growth, 
which includes the operational performance improvements described above, as well as 
through inorganic growth, which is facilitated through add-on acquisitions (Morkötter & 
Wetzer, 2016). In fact, the use of M&A has become a highly relevant way to improve 
operations in private equity portfolio firms (see e.g. Hammer et al, 2017, Brigl et al., 
2016 and 2012). A study by Hammer and colleagues (2016) show that the involvement 
of private equity firms increases the probability of M&A activity to double and private 
equity investors tend to prefer quantity over complexity in the acquisitions. In addition, 
a study by Brigl and colleagues (2016) reports that the amount of private equity 
portfolio firms that included add-on acquisitions rose from 20% to 53% during the 
period of 2000 - 2012. The popularity seems understandable, considering the study 
results by Brigl and colleagues (2016): the private equity deals, where add-on 
acquisitions are present, generated an average IRR (i.e. internal rate of return) of 31,6%. 
The standalone private equity deals without add-on acquisitions generated an average 
IRR of 23,1% in the study. 
 
Morkötter and Wetzer (2016) define add-on acquisitions as transactions that 
“occur when a private equity portfolio company acquires – with the explicit financial 
and managerial backing of the underlying private equity fund – another company to fuel 
further growth or to boost operational excellence” (pp. 1-2). Private equity investors 
can either accompany the portfolio firm in the acquisition process, or execute it directly 
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(Morkötter & Wetzer, 2016). Importantly, the incentives of the private equity firms and 
the portfolio firms need to be aligned for the execution of only value-adding 
transactions (Moon, 2006). Some researchers identify buy-and-build strategies as 
distinctive concept related to, but separate from, the add-on acquisitions, whereas to 
some researches the buy-and-build strategies equals to using acquisitions in general (see 
e.g. Morkötter & Wetzer, 2016, and Hammer et al., 2017). The typical definition seems 
to be that in buy-and-build cases a platform (i.e. the portfolio firm) is acquired, and then 
used to facilitate numerous add-on acquisitions (Morkötter & Wetzer, 2016).  
 
The timing of add-on investments is closely tied to the fact that the investment 
period is limited and fairly short. The add-on acquisitions are typically performed in the 
first one to three years of the investment period (Morkötter & Wetzer, 2016), and the 
rest of the investment period is spent integrating them (Hammer et al., 2016). The 
findings by Hammer and colleagues (2017) suggest that speed in the add-on acquisition 
execution is important to the private equity firms, as the use of add-ons require time-
consuming processes (e.g. integration) and thus the late use of them may delay the exit 
from the portfolio firm. This is supported by the research results by Hammer (2016) 
which report that the use of buy-and-build strategies lengthen the investment periods. 
 
While private equity firms may be able to create value from buying the portfolio 
firms with a discount, the discount is not present at the add-on acquisition deals, as the 
pricing is similar to that of any strategic acquirer (Morkötter & Wetzer, 2016). This 
indicates that add-on acquisitions are meant to be synergistic, and the value of add-on 
acquisitions is often a result of traditional synergy levers, improved sales force 
effectiveness, and pricing (Brigl et al., 2016). Add-on acquisitions can also increase 
revenue growth (Brigl et al., 2016). The motivations for add-on acquisitions are not 
much researched. The previous research, however, suggests that add-on acquisitions 
can, at least, be used to roll-up competition in an industry that is fragmented to achieve 
economies of scale or market power (Hammer et al., 2016). 
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3  Strategic Planning in Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
Many academics have endeavored to understand the complexities of buying and selling 
companies, varying from topics such as performance and returns of mergers and 
acquisitions (see e.g. Barney, 1988, Epstein, 2005)), learning in acquisitions (see e.g. 
Aktas et al., 2013), and the integration of newly acquired companies (see e.g. Gates & 
Very, 2003, Schweizer, 2005). One perspective adopted to better understand how 
individual M&A unfold is the M&A process. While the M&A process may have 
different presentations depending of the researcher, the idea is generally similar in each: 
acquisitions start with pre-combination, or pre-acquisition phase, followed by the 
pivotal moment of ownership transfer, and concluded by the post-combination, or post-
acquisition phase (Gomes et al., 2013). The M&A process in its basic form is presented 
in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1 - The M&A Process 
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The exact steps that are outlined in M&A process phases depends on the 
researcher. Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) present what they call the conventional view 
where strategic objectives, search and screening, strategic evaluation, economic 
evaluation and negotiations can be seen as part of the pre-combination phase, agreement 
as a part of the M&A transaction, and integration in the post-combination phase. 
However, in the same article, Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) also challenge the 
conventional view as too segmented and rigid, where integration related issues are not 
considered prior to the deal but left to the managers to deal with after the transaction is 
completed. This limitation is considered in Hubbard’s (2001) process, where these 
M&A phases are filled with slightly more planning-oriented steps. In her model, 
acquisition objectives, acquisition overview and acquisition blueprint which is a plan 
for the upcoming implementation are all part of the pre-combination. Followed with 
communication that can be seen as part of the M&A transaction, and implementation, 
stabilization, and monitoring belong to the post-acquisition phase. Arguably, the steps 
in the process also depend on the type of planner as well - for different planners 
different steps are emphasized in the process. 
 
In the following, the focus is on the pre-combination phase: the different types of 
planning that can take place prior the acquisition transaction are explored. These types 
vary from doing very little prior planning, to planning that covers not just one, but a 
compilation of multiple acquisitions over time. The different planning types are 
organized into three categories that describe and illustrate the different forms of M&A 
planning. The categories are Non-Planners, Strategic Planners, and Acquisition Program 
Planners. They are presented in the following sections. 
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3.1 Non-Planners 
 
It is acknowledged that companies engage in acquisitions without a strategic plan (see 
e.g. Hubbard, 2001). In these cases, the firms tend to act as a response to a sporadic 
opportunity, and acquisitions are seen more as strategies in themselves, instead of 
considering them as means to implement an existing corporate strategy (Weber et al., 
2014). In their groundbreaking study in 1970, Ansoff and colleagues found out that 
those firms that engage in this kind of unplanned opportunistic approach are not only 
likely to skip planning altogether, if they fail to plan even one step, but also their 
acquisitions perform worse than those firms’ that plan systematically. In this thesis 
these kinds of acquirers will be known as “Non-Planners”. The overview of the Non-
Planners’ M&A process is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2 - The M&A Process of Non-Planners 
 
Acquiring companies for non-strategic, such as personal and political, reasons is 
fairly common (Hubbard, 2001), although they are not usually cited as the official 
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reasons for acquisitions (Trautwein, 1990). Potential non-strategic reasons for 
acquisitions arising from the managerial self-interest include a management 
compensation that rewards M&A activity and management’s inflated self-confidence in 
own abilities to perform acquisitions, also known as managerial hubris (Haleblian et al., 
2009). The underlying problem with non-strategic motives is that the actions that need 
to be taken after the M&A transaction are often ignored or largely overlooked as the 
mere fact that the M&A deal has gone through means that the personal or political goal 
has been achieved, no matter what happens to the M&A target afterwards (Hubbard, 
2001). 
 
The poor performance of Non-Planners if often attributed to financial estimates 
receiving disproportionate amount of emphasis as strategic estimates are left out (Weber 
et al., 2014, Marks & Mirvis, 2001). In these types of cases, the steps of the M&A 
process shrink mainly to analysis of financial terms (Marks & Mirvis, 2001), which 
leads to a results-oriented focus where acquisitions are seen as on-off deals (Haspeslagh 
& Jemison, 1970).  The focal points of interests for acquiring companies are financial 
figures such as combined balance sheet of the two companies, projected cash flows and 
the anticipated return on investment (Marks & Mirvis, 2001). Also, as the “hard” 
financial estimates and criteria are considered as the ones the firm should to focus on, 
“softer” matters and concerns, such as cultural fit, tend to be dismissed and the deal 
moves forward as long as the financials look acceptable (Marks & Mirvis, 2015). 
 
3.2 Strategic Planners 
 
Mergers and acquisitions seem to be difficult to perform successfully. For example, 
according to a study by King and colleagues (2004), acquisitions do not lead to superior 
financial performance, but possibly to a minor negative effect in the long-term financial 
performance. Failure rates of acquisitions, depending on the source, linger between 70 
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percent and 90 percent (Christensen et al., 2011). There are many reasons why 
acquisitions can fail, but previous research has also found ways to alleviate these risks. 
Ansoff and colleagues (1970) found out in their research that planning acquisitions 
leads to not only significantly better results, but also to more predictable performance 
compared to forgoing planning. In addition, those companies that have a strategy and 
experience with acquisitions are more successful than those with less experience or with 
a reactive approach (Non-Planners) to acquisitions (Gomes et al., 2013). Figure 3 shows 
the M&A process for Strategic Planners. Compared to Non-Planners (Figure 2) the pre-
combination phase of Strategic Planners is more extensive, which may explain some of 
the performance differences between the two types.  
 
 
Figure 3 - The M&A Process of Strategic Planners 
 
 
Strategic planning of mergers and acquisitions starts with the strategy of the 
company - strategy and its goals are like a common thread that travels through the 
M&A planning. Before any acquisitions are considered, the company is clear on where 
it is and what it aspires to achieve: its strengths and weaknesses, competitive and market 
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position, management’s goals, and so on (Marks & Mirvis, 2001). From knowing these, 
the company can set direction for itself, whatever it may be; for example diversification 
into new businesses, market penetration in its existing ones, increasing growth, or 
improving profitability (Marks & Mirvis, 2001). Regardless of what the strategy that the 
company embarks on is, the next step would be to assess whether or not its ambitions 
are best served with a merger or an acquisition, or if there are better alternatives 
(Hubbard, 2001). 
 
    There are substitutes to acquisitions, although they are not always considered. 
A company may choose to not to acquire, but to build by itself what it was hoping to 
achieve with an acquisition (Trautwein, 1990). However, there are options between 
these two ends as well: joint ventures, strategic alliances, substantial cross-holdings, and 
long-term customer and supplier agreements (Hubbard, 2001). However, judging 
whether or not to ally with another company instead of acquiring it is not an easy 
decision (Dyer et al., 2004). What is more, these options are not always considered at 
all, but rather companies jump straight to the decision to employ acquisitions (Hubbard, 
2001). 
 
    If, and when, a company decides to move on with an acquisition, the strategic 
planners derive the acquisition objectives from the strategic objectives (Weber et al., 
2014). In the current academic literature, there is an abundance of different motives 
used for acquisitions. Bower (2001) categorizes acquisitions into five distinct strategies 
based on the challenge they are used to tackle: Overcapacity, geographic roll-up, 
product or market extension, R&D, and industry convergence. Christensen and 
colleagues (2011), on the other hand, take the perspective of the business model: 
acquisitions can either improve the current performance, or reinvent the company’s 
business model. Then again, Hubbard (2001) categorizes the strategic M&A motives 
into six different categories: Market penetration, vertical expansion, financial synergies, 
market entry, asset potential or synergy, and economies of scale. Similar lists of 
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different motives can be found in a multitude of M&A related articles (see. e.g. Schuler 
& Jackson, 2001) which suggests that there is a variety of motivations for acquisitions. 
 
    Like with the acquisition objectives, strategy steers the decision of what kinds 
of target companies the company should pursue. The selection of potential M&A targets 
is driven by the overall strategy and the strategic goals of the acquisition (Weber et al., 
2014). Deep understanding of the financial estimates is important to strategic planners, 
but they also include an analysis what the company would need to do to achieve those 
estimates (Marks & Mirvis, 2001). Managers of the acquiring companies are needed to 
present a rationale for the acquisition that is not only distinct and persuasive, but also it 
needs to go beyond the numbers to include non-financial estimates (Marks & Mirvis, 
2001).  
 
The role of integration and planning it in advance, has gained attention in the 
academic research. Academics have argued that planning the integration early on 
contributes to the success of mergers and acquisitions (see e.g. Schuler & Jackson, 
2001, Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). In this case, “early on” means preferably before 
the M&A deal closes (Gates & Very, 2003), instead of delegating the whole integration 
in the post-combination phase to those managers who were not part of the pre-
combination phase decision-making (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). Marks and Mirvis 
(2015) list four best practices in the pre-combination phase for better success from the 
perspective of human and organizational aspects: Behavioral and cultural due diligence, 
vision for the combined organization, integration planning process, and integration 
principles and priorities.  
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3.3 Acquisition Program Planners  
 
Out of the three M&A planner types - Non-Planners, Strategic Planners, and 
Acquisition Program Planners - the third is the most recent one to appear in the 
academic literature. Known often either as acquisition programs, or some times as serial 
acquirers, these types of acquirers are still finding their way to the academic research as 
an emerging field of study (Laamanen & Keil, 2008). Given that serial acquirers 
perform nearly one fourth of all acquisitions (Kengelbach et al., 2011) and that 
acquisition programs are widely used by companies (Keil et al., 2012), the lack of 
academic literature on the topic is almost surprising. 
 
Although similar on many aspects, serial acquirers and those firms that use 
acquisition programs are not exactly the same. Serial acquirers are companies that are 
active with M&A deals: depending on the definition, they acquire at least between two 
(Henningsson, 2015) to four (Kengelbach et al., 2011) firms in three years. Companies 
using acquisition programs are serial acquirers, but with a more focused action. As 
defined by Keil and colleagues (2012) acquisition programs are “sequences of 
acquisitions initiated by an acquiring firm, with the intention of achieving a specific 
business goal or market position” (p.153). Those serial acquirers without an acquisition 
program can be seen as companies that actively acquire by using either strategic 
planning, or little planning at all. On the other hand, acquisition programs have a 
distinctive difference compared to Strategic Planners (Figure 3), as the company is 
striving to achieve the strategic goal at hand by not only one merger or acquisition, but 
with a collation of multiple, often significantly interdependent acquisitions (Chatterjee, 
2009). Chatterjee (2009) suggests that serial acquirers are successful only when the 
acquisitions are part of an acquisition program. In this thesis, Acquisition Program 
Planners (Figure 4) will mainly refer to those companies that use acquisition programs.  
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Managing acquisition programs requires additional capabilities, compared to 
managing single acquisitions, to tackle the added complexity rising from managing 
multiple acquisitions within the same program. On the individual acquisition level, the 
firms follow the lines of strategic planning (see e.g. Marks & Mirvis, 2001), described 
above in Section 3.2. However, on top of the capability of managing single acquisitions, 
managing the whole acquisition program can be seen as one layer above that (Laamanen 
& Keil, 2008) as illustrated in Figure 4. It is not enough to perform only the individual 
acquisitions well, the program itself also needs to be managed to be successful (Keil et 
al., 2012). 
 
 
Figure 4 - The M&A Process of Acquisition Program Planners 
 
First and foremost, acquisition programs need a clearly articulated business logic 
for the acquisitions to follow, as well as coordination across the acquisitions in the 
program (Keil et al, 2012, Chatterjee, 2009). Keil and colleagues (2012) list four 
capabilities needed for performing acquisition programs, illustrating the how 
multifaceted and complex acquisition programs can be: 1. Capability to pace the 
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acquisition program, 2. Capability to optimize the program scope, 3. Capability to 
acquire optimally sized and strategically, organizationally, and culturally fit targets, and 
4. Capability to manage multiple simultaneous integration processes. Other 
characteristics that make acquisition programs successful are, according to Chatterjee 
(2009), the ability to identify and exploit market inefficiencies, the conscious strive for 
a win-win deal, and not deviating from established processes. 
 
It is worth to note, however, that although acquisition programs are purposeful, 
they are not always set in stone. Acquisition programs do not necessarily turn out as the 
company originally had planned (Keil et al., 2012). It is possible that an acquisition 
program is prematurely terminated before its planned end or that the program gets a new 
meaning in the acquiring firm (Keil et al., 2012). Serendipity can also play a role in the 
beginning of the acquisition program itself, making it an emergent strategy (Chatterjee, 
2009, Keil et al., 2012). Acquisition programs may be initiated almost by accident after 
a firm completes a few acquisitions and starts to see a pattern common to all of them 
(Chatterjee, 2009). Similarly, the first acquisition in an acquisition program might be, 
for example, a learning acquisition that is used to understand a new business 
environment or a new business area. If that acquisition turns out to be successful, it may 
become the start of an acquisition program used to gain foothold in the new area or 
environment (Keil et al., 2012). 
 
The different motives and business logics for a firm to engage in an acquisition 
program are not thoroughly explored in the current literature. Keil and colleagues 
(2012) do, however, note that they have identified acquisition programs to follow the 
categorization presented by Bower (2001) for single acquisitions, as described above: 
Geographical roll-up, product or market extension, R&D, overcapacity, and industry 
convergence. An acquisition program, in some cases, may demonstrate characteristics 
of multiple motives (Keil et al., 2012). In his article, Chatterjee (2009) lists examples of 
acquisition programs. These all seem to follow the categorization by Bower (2001); for 
example, Nestlé used acquisition programs to gain market share by expanding its 
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product lines, and Invacare had an acquisition program that had the objective of 
geographical expansion. Naturally, these anecdotal examples are not enough to 
determine the full scope of different motives of acquisition programs, but they do offer 
support to Keil and colleagues (2012) and their observations.  
 
Bringing together the three planning categories, Non-Planners, Strategic Planners, 
and Acquisition Program Planners, distinctive differences between them can be 
observed along two high-level characteristics: the number of acquisitions they focus on 
and the level of strategic planning. Figure 5 shows the placement of each planning type 
within the matrix created by the two characteristics on the axes. In this matrix, the serial 
acquirers are also added to the figure to illustrate the differences between them and 
Acquisition Program Planners. Although serial acquirers can, on the individual 
acquisition level, act like Strategic Planners, the collection of the acquisitions is not 
strategic in the same way the acquisition programs are. This is why the serial acquirers 
are placed in the non-strategic multiple acquisitions box in the matrix.  
 
 
Figure 5 - Overview of the Planning Categories
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4 Theoretical Framework 
 
The theoretical framework presented in this chapter forms the backbone for the study. It 
summarizes the key ideas from the literature review, on both private equity and M&A 
planning. In addition, the theoretical framework serves as the underlying structure for 
the presentation of the empirical findings, as well as for the analysis and discussion of 
the findings. 
 
To understand better how the private equity investors plan the overall acquisition 
activity of their portfolio firms, the theoretical framework follows five defining 
characteristics of different M&A planning categories: link to strategy, M&A motives, 
timing, evaluation criteria, and integration planning. These are presented in Table 1. The 
characteristics illustrate the key differences between the approaches to planning, and 
they are derived from the academic literature presented in the previous chapter. By 
mapping the overall acquisition planning by the private equity investors according to 
these characteristics in the empirical part, it will be easier to understand if the 
acquisition planning is similar to one of the three categories (Non-planners, Strategic 
Planners or Acquisition Program Planners), or if the category varies case by case. It 
could also be possible that acquisition planning in portfolio firms is a combination of 
these categories. The categories offer a structure to identify these possible differences. 
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Table 1 -  M&A Planning Characteristics 
Planning 
Characteristics 
Non-planners Strategic Planners Acquisition program 
planners 
Link to Strategy Little to no link to 
strategy 
Thorough planning 
where the objectives of 
an acquisition are 
compared to the overall 
strategic aspirations of 
the company 
Collection of M&As 
are seen as a program, 
which is used to 
achieve a specific goal 
linked to strategy 
 
M&A Motives Managerial self-
interest, personal and 
political goals 
Multitude of potential 
motives: e.g. expansion 
in the product offering 
or markets, R&D, 
geographic extension, 
and so on  
Acquisition programs 
seem to use similar 
motives as applied in 
individual strategic 
M&As 
Timing of M&A Sporadic, M&As arise 
from observed 
opportunities 
When M&A is the best 
option compared to 
alternative ways to 
fulfil the strategic 
objectives 
Timing of individual 
M&As is driven by the 
goals and pace of the 
acquisition program 
Evaluation Criteria Mainly financial 
estimates 
Financial and strategic 
estimates in balance, 
including e.g. analysis 
of behavioral and 
cultural differences 
Financial and strategic 
estimates in balance, as 
well as the fit within 
the acquisition 
program is considered 
Integration Planning Little to no integration 
planning 
Integration is planned 
before the M&A 
transaction 
Integration is planned 
in each individual 
acquisition before the 
M&A transaction 
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If we consider the link to strategy, it seems plausible that the acquisitions of the 
portfolio firms are linked to a “bigger plan” by the private equity investors. As 
described in the literature review, private equity firms seek portfolio firms that can 
generate financial returns in a fairly short time period, in four to six years on average, 
and have clear paths to exit. This means that the portfolio firms need clear direction in 
their activities. Thus, it could be sensible that not only do the private equity investors 
have a strategy for the portfolio firms for the duration of the investment period, but also 
that the actions, acquisitions in this case, are tied to the plan to ensure their prompt 
execution. 
 
It seems that the previous research has not explored the different M&A motives 
when it comes to private equity portfolio companies. However, using acquisitions is a 
popular means among the private equity investors to create value by improving the 
operational performance and by growing the company. That would suggest that the 
motivations could be tied to a value creation plan the private equity investors have for 
the company. For example, the motivations can serve to increase the revenue of the 
portfolio firm or to gain larger share in their market.  
 
The timing, on the other hand, is discussed more in the current literature. Due to 
the limited investment period, there is a pressure to complete the acquisitions as fast as 
possible, in order to reap the gains from the acquisitions before the investment period is 
over. In this respect, it would make sense for the private equity investors to act fast with 
the acquisitions and execute them right at the beginning of the investment. As described 
by the previous research, acquisitions are typically executed in the first one to three 
years of the investment period (Morkötter & Wetzer, 2015). 
 
Not much is known about the evaluation criteria used for acquisitions in the 
private equity portfolio firms. However, the literature review illustrates the different 
ways private equity investors introduce governance methods to the portfolio firms and 
how they actively participate in the investment. It could be possible that the governance 
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consequently extends to the M&A evaluation criteria as well, and the acquisitions 
would need to create value from the perspective of the private equity investor. However, 
how that value creation potential would be assessed in the acquisitions, is not clear from 
the private equity literature.  
 
Considering the planning of integration, there is little we know of that from the 
private equity literature. However, from the M&A literature it is quite clear that the 
integration plays a notable role in the success of the acquisitions, or in the value 
creation of acquisitions. As the private equity investors are largely driven by value 
creation in order to create returns from the investments, it would seem to make sense for 
them to also pay attention to the planning of the integration.  
 
However, only describing what the acquisition planning by the private equity 
investors looks like, on the basis of these five characteristics, does not seem a sufficient 
to understand the planning in the unique context of private equity. From the literature 
presented in Chapter 2, we know that private equity investors participate in their 
investments. Thus, the theoretical framework includes also the influence that is specific 
to private equity and arises from the unique investment model where private equity 
investors introduce governance models to their investments and engage in the decision-
making in the portfolio firms. To explore this area, the study also looks into the role of 
the private equity investors to understand how involved the private equity investors 
actually are in the M&A activity of their portfolio firms. By investigating if the private 
equity investors focus on giving general guidelines for the overall acquisition activity or 
if they also participate in the individual acquisitions helps to put the planning 
characteristics to the correct perspective. 
 
As illustrated by the literature review, in general, the private equity investors 
influence the actions and decisions of the portfolio firms at the board level, keeping 
away from the day-to-day activities. However, with regard to the acquisitions, it seems 
that the private equity investors can either accompany the firm in the process, or they 
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can execute the acquisitions themselves. Executing the acquisitions themselves seems to 
be actually quite close to the day-to-day activities. Where is the line drawn in 
acquisitions - how much do private equity investors do versus how much do the 
portfolio firms do? Does that stay the same or vary in different situations? In addition to 
the characteristics of M&A planning, the study also seeks to understand the different 
ways  private equity investors can participate in the acquisitions, and whether that varies 
depending on the characteristics of the case firm or is the same across all of them. 
 
The theoretical framework is presented in Table 2. It summarizes main points 
from above, placing the M&A literature and the private equity literature side by side to 
show the perspectives from the two streams of literature. Compared to Table 1, Table 2 
also includes the literature on the role of the private equity investor for a more 
comprehensive view. These six characteristics form the basis for the empirical findings. 
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Table 2 - Theoretical Framework 
Planning 
Characteristics 
M&A Literature Private Equity Literature 
Link to Strategy Non-Planners: Little to no link to strategy 
Strategic Planners: M&A objectives are 
compared to the strategy 
Acquisition program planners: A 
collection of M&As to achieve a strategy 
driven goal 
Portfolio firms need to have 
clear direction to generate 
returns. Seems plausible that 
the use of M&As is considered 
in this context, although there 
is little about the topic in 
literature. 
M&A Motives Non-Planners: Personal & Political goals 
Strategic Planners: Multitude of 
potential motives 
Acquisition Program Planners: Similar 
to Strategic Planners 
Not explored in the literature. 
Possibly linked to the ways PE 
investors strive to create value. 
Timing of M&A Non-Planners: Sporadic, arise from 
opportunities 
Strategic Planners: When the best option 
compared to other strategic options 
Acquisition Program Planners: Driven 
by the goals and pace of the program 
In the first 1-3 years of the 
limited investment period to 
reap the benefits. 
Evaluation Criteria Non-Planners: Mainly financial 
Strategic Planners: Financial and 
strategic estimates in balance 
Acquisition Program Planners: 
Financial and strategic estimates in 
balance, fit within the program 
Little academic literature on 
the topic. Acquisitions are 
likely required to create value. 
Integration Planning Non-Planners: Little to no integration 
planning 
Strategic Planners: Integration planning 
before the M&A transaction 
Acquisition Program Planners: Planned 
before each M&A transaction 
Not explored in the literature. 
Role of Private 
Equity Investor 
-- Typically, active but limited to 
working at board of the 
company. Can also execute 
M&As directly 
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5 Research Design and Methods 
 
This chapter describes how this study was conducted. In the following, the chosen 
research method and its justification will be covered, including the sampling decisions, 
data collection sources and techniques, as well as the analysis techniques. The chapter 
concludes with an evaluation of the study. 
 
5.1 Research Method and Justification 
 
Both the mergers and acquisitions literature and the private equity literature have been 
dominated by quantitative studies, while qualitative studies are a minority. The bulk of 
private equity research follows the traditions of finance research, which tends to rely on 
the use of quantitative statistical methods, using large samples of archival and survey 
data (Wood & Wright, 2009). 
 
The situation has been similar in mergers and acquisitions research, although 
possibly to a lesser extent. Especially the research originating from the USA, with focus 
on performance determinants, relies on quantitative methods (Meglio & Risberg, 2010). 
However, the use of qualitative methods is on the rise, especially in the research that 
originates from the Nordic countries (Meglio & Risberg, 2010). However, that is still a 
minority and quantitative cross-sectional studies continue to prevail. To rejuvenate the 
M&A research field, Meglio and Risberg (2010) promote the use of qualitative methods 
where appropriate, instead of solely relying on quantitative methods.  
 
In both fields of study, there is room for the use of qualitative methods, and the 
use of them could bring refreshing perspectives to the fields. To answer this call, in this 
thesis follows the qualitative tradition of a case study. As the research question of the 
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thesis is exploratory by nature, seeking to explore how private equity investors plan the 
overall acquisition activity, a case study is a fitting choice (see e.g. Yin, 2009). 
 
The thesis follows especially the extensive case study method, in comparison to 
intensive case study. In the extensive case studies the goal is to 1) test or extend prior 
theory or 2) to create new theory (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). The former of the two 
is the aim of this study, as discussed in Chapter 4. In an extensive case study, the focus 
is on the issue, or in this case, the M&A process, rather than the individuals themselves, 
who instead are the focus of intensive case studies (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). In 
other words, in the context of this study, the focus is on the process of planning, rather 
than on the individuals who are interviewed in order to collect the data. 
 
Overall, this study was created in an iterative manner. After completing a 
preliminary version of the literature review and the research design, the first interviews 
were set up. After these first interviews, the theoretical concepts and their relevance 
were assessed, and the need for additional data was determined. In this way, the 
additional interviews were set up and again the proposed theoretical concepts were 
evaluated and adjusted with more suitable literature. Once the empirical data seemed 
robust enough, no more interviews were set up and the focus moved to the finalization 
of the theoretical concepts and to a more in-depth analysis of the results. 
 
5.2 Unit of Analysis and Sampling Decisions 
 
The basis of a case study is the bounded unit of a case (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008, 
Yin, 2009). A case in this study consists of a firm that is or has been invested in by a 
private equity firm, i.e. a portfolio firm. The study is carried out as a multiple case study 
with five cases, as the use of multiple cases, instead of one, is seen to produce more 
robust results (Yin, 2009). Each of these cases will be described separately as within-
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case analyses, which are then followed by a comparison of the cases as cross-case 
analysis (see e.g. Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). The analysis techniques are discussed 
in more detail in Section 5.4.  
 
The case companies selected for the study needed to fulfill two criteria: 1) 
investment by a private equity firm, and 2) acquisitions had been used during the private 
equity investment period. The sampling did not follow the logic of surveys and other 
quantitative studies, as is normal for case studies (Yin, 2009). Instead, the cases in this 
study were selected with replication logic (Yin, 2009) in mind. However, not seeking 
literal replication, or full similarity in the selected case firms (see e.g. Yin, 2009), was a 
deliberate choice. Instead, the case firms present broadly two types of firms: 1) those 
that had plenty of M&A experience prior to the private equity investment and 
performed many acquisitions during the investment period, and 2) those that had little 
prior M&A experience and performed fewer acquisitions during the investment period. 
This logic ensures the study is able to observe and to take into the account the potential 
differences between the different types of portfolio firms.  
 
To fulfill the first criterion (investment by private equity firm), the cases selected 
for the purposes of this study represent five companies which, currently or in the past, 
have been managed by different private equity companies. In each case, the private 
equity firm held a majority ownership (>50%), which allowed them to more directly 
influence the activities of the portfolio firms. Thus, also their impact on the acquisition 
activity would be more meaningful. The goal of case company selection was to choose 
portfolio firms that were exited by their private equity firm, or at least close to the exit, 
if still under the private equity ownership. This was important, as the timeframe allowed 
to look into the M&A activity during the whole investment period, and thus allowed the 
discussion of actual events and activities and avoided forward looking guesses and 
forecasts. Equally important was that the exit by the private equity firm was fairly 
recent. If a long time would have passed since the exit, the risk of recall bias would be 
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higher in collected data, although avoiding it completely would likely be very difficult 
in this kind of a study. 
 
With regard to the second selection criterion (must have M&A activity), the 
potential case firms were evaluated based on what could be found from public sources 
(such as news and private equity firm websites) as well as from M&A databases 
(especially Zephyr). In healthcare industry acquisitions seemed to be attractive and 
firms in healthcare industry had been popular targets for private equity firms as well, 
thus access to them seemed possible. Acquisitions had been popular also in the 
construction industry, but unfortunately access to those firms was difficult to negotiate. 
On the other hand, those firms that had been less active in acquisitions represent 
different industries, and there were no clear industries that should be chosen for the 
study. All in all, each of the chosen case firms had used acquisitions, at least once, 
during the private equity investment period. 
 
By applying these two criteria, the result is a subset of companies operating in 
Finland, which are nearing the end of private equity investment, or have been owned by 
a private equity firm in the recent past. When presence of M&A activity in considered, 
the remaining pool of potential case firms is somewhat limited. For example, in 2017, 
Finnish private equity firms exited only 66 firms (Pääomasijoittajat, 2018) and that 
figure does not consider the M&A activity criteria. For added variability, the case 
companies were also chosen so that they would represent different private equity firms, 
instead of them being invested by a same firm. This however, was not a “hard” criterion 
to the extent the two criteria described above were. The selection of the case firms on 
this aspect was also partly driven by access to interviewees (more about the 
interviewees below). As a result, five companies were selected for this study. The case 
companies are summarized in Table 3. 
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Table 3 - Overview of Selected Case Companies 
Case Private 
equity 
firm 
Type of 
Acquirer 
Previously 
PE-
backed 
Ongoing investment 
1 1 Frequent No No 
2 2 Frequent Yes No 
3 3 Frequent Yes At the time of the interview yes, 
exit since then 
4 3 Less 
frequent 
Yes Yes 
5 4 Less 
frequent 
No No 
 
 
5.3 Data Collection and Interviewing Technique 
 
The data collected for the study consists of both a primary source in the form of 
interviews and supplementary secondary sources, such as websites, news and annual 
reports. The interviews were open, unstructured interviews (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 
2008). The interviews remained conversational in the manner, but still leaned on a set of 
topics that helped to guide the interview and to keep the conversation flowing. This 
suits the research question well, as it allows for leeway in the collection of empirical 
data to ensure that all the topics the interviewees found relevant were covered (Eriksson 
& Kovalainen, 2008). The interviews were held during the period from April to October 
2018. There were in total six interviews, as for one case the interviewee was 
interviewed in two parts due to time constraints. The length of the interviews varied 
from approximately 40 minutes to 1 hour 10 minutes and the language of the interviews 
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was Finnish except for one that was held in English. The interviews are presented in 
Table 4. 
 
The interviewees themselves represent the private equity firms, as that allowed 
them to explore the ways they and their companies have influenced the portfolio firms 
on acquisitions. They were also able to speak more generally about private equity and 
how it works, which ensured that the data encompasses the big picture of the investment 
as well. The added benefit of interviewing the private equity side is that they often plan 
their investments before the actual investment transaction, and the actions taken during 
the investment period are largely contingent on the plans they made before the 
investment. Thus, including these decisions in the collected data seems sensible. 
Finally, considering that changing the management is one of the means private equity 
investors tend to use in their portfolio firms, finding suitable interviewees on the 
company side might have been more time consuming that is sensible for a study of this 
scope. 
 
Table 4 - Overview of the Interviews 
Case Title of 
Interviewee 
Time of the Interview Interview 
Language 
Interview 
Length 
1 Partner April 2018 English 50 min 
2 Partner May 2018 Finnish 40 min 
3 Partner May 2018 Finnish 45 min 
4 Director August 2018 Finnish 60 min 
5 Investment 
Professional 
September 2018 & October 
2018 
Finnish 20 min + 50 
min 
 
The potential interviewees were found by searching the websites of different 
private equity firms that operate in Finland. The website of Pääomasijoittajat - Finnish 
Venture Capital Association, served as a good source for identifying potentially suitable 
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private equity firms. The potential interviewees were contacted via email and the 
interviews were held at the offices of the private equity firms, except for one which was 
held via an online meeting platform. 
 
The interviewees were encouraged to talk as much as they wanted, as well as to 
feel free to talk off the topic wherever they saw it relevant. In addition, any comments 
or explanations of how private equity works in general (instead of comments strictly on 
the case) were accepted and encouraged. This allowed to gather data on variety of 
topics, and helped to understand the context better, even if some of the answers were 
out of the scope of the study and thus not used in formulating the findings. The 
questions asked from the interviewees remained mainly open-ended, but also some 
closed questions were used. The closed questions were essentially used to clarify given 
answers to check that they were understood correctly.  
 
One of the strengths of a case study is the ability to use different sources of data to 
complement the interviews (Yin, 2009). In this study, annual reports, news and websites 
of the portfolio companies as well the websites of the private equity firms were used to 
acquire additional data for building informed case descriptions. The same sources were 
also used prior to the interviews to help to prepare for them. 
 
5.4 Analysis of Data 
 
As mentioned above, the analysis of the collected data follows the idea of within-case 
analysis combined with cross-case analysis, both of which are often used in multi-case 
studies (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). Firstly, in the within-case analysis, the five 
different cases are constructed into separate, holistic descriptions that depict the overall 
situation and context in each case. In cross-case analysis, the cases and the responses 
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given by the interviewees are investigated to understand what the different interviewees 
had to say about the topics presented in the theoretical framework.  
 
In this study, the analysis of the data is largely based on the theoretical framework 
described in the previous chapter. The analytic technique chosen for the study is similar 
to what Yin (2009) calls Pattern Matching. In this technique, the empirical data is 
compared against a predicted pattern (Yin, 2009). In other words, the theoretical 
framework provides a structure for the empirical part and thus allows for a meaningful 
grouping and analysis of the data. 
 
In practice, all of the interviews, except for one, were recorded. The recordings, 
and the notes for the one which was not recorded, were transcribed into case memos. 
Based on these memos, the all of collected data was evaluated, and the data from 
different cases was combined into broad topics that seemed potentially match the 
different aspects of the theoretical framework. Some of the data was also categorized to 
be used mainly in the case descriptions, although the case descriptions used data from 
the other topics as well. After the general categorizations, each topic was inspected 
more closely to notice similarities and dissimilarities between the cases. In addition to 
the comparisons between the cases, the theoretical assumptions arising from the 
literature review were also compared against the empirical data to evaluate which parts 
of the data discussed these assumptions and what might be new information outside the 
scope of the current literature. Throughout the analysis, the data was checked back 
against the memos, as well as the original recordings and notes, to make sure that the 
meaning of the data was not lost or altered during the analysis. 
 
To ensure the privacy of the participating private equity firms and the 
interviewees, as well as the portfolio firms, the case firms are issued code names in this 
study. The code names HealthCo, RetailCo, FoodCo indicate the industry the case 
companies operate in, but do not hold any additional information, for example related to 
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the real company names or the private equity firms and should not be taken as anything 
else but placeholder names. 
 
5.5 Evaluation of the Study 
 
Although the chosen research method seems to be suitable for a study of this size, it is 
still worth to consider what might have been alternative ways to conduct the study. For 
example, the topic would benefit from longitudinal research that observes the process of 
planning as it happens (instead of retrospective viewpoint which is subject to e.g. recall 
bias) (see more Van de Ven, 1992). However, for the time constraints and the difficulty 
of access, this was not possible within the scope of this thesis. In addition, although not 
the same study, but a study on the same topic could have been also conducted by using 
quantitative methods. For example, it is worth mentioning that although the goal of this 
study is to explore a new area, extensive case studies cannot generalize results to apply 
to certain populations in a same way that quantitative statistical studies can (Eriksson & 
Kovalainen, 2008). Instead, the generalizations apply to theoretical propositions (Yin, 
2009: 15). But then again, a quantitative study would have ignored the call for more 
qualitative studies.  
 
There are also a few things to consider about the sampling decisions. Although the 
potential case firms were listed and evaluated for their fit in the sampling criteria, the 
final selection of case firms was affected by sheer access to the interviewees. This may 
potentially lead to a bias in the results, affecting the results. Although unfortunate if so, 
as the selection for interviewees was driven mainly by access, there is little that can be 
done to avoid this potential bias altogether. 
 
In the data collection and interviewing technique, it is worth to note that the 
interviewees were given almost a “carte blanche”, or the freedom to discuss what they 
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saw relevant (regarding the overall topic at hand). Although this resulted in a broad 
collection of data and allowed for the inclusion of such details and topics that would 
have otherwise gone unnoticed, it also affected the comprehensiveness of the data. This 
means that none of interviewee discussed the same things, leaving potential gaps in the 
data in the sense that some of the findings rely on information given by only a subset of 
the interviewees. 
 
    Also considering the interviewing technique, the interviews were mainly held 
in Finnish. As this thesis is written in English, the direct quotes presented in the next 
chapter mostly translated. The original wording is preserved as much as possible, but 
since it is difficult to translate the quotes verbatim, some adjustments had to be made to 
convey the message in, at least somewhat understandable, English. To avoid 
misinterpretations of the original quotes, the quotes were firstly translated word for 
word, and then adjusted as little as possible to make the message coherent, in order to 
keep as much of the original quote as possible. 
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6 Empirical Findings and Discussion 
 
In this chapter, the results of the study that was described in the previous chapter, are 
explored, which will lead to the overall findings of the thesis. Firstly, in the first section, 
the five cases selected for the study are described to present the different cases on which 
the research findings are built. The rest of the chapter is devoted to cross-case analysis 
which is structured around the six characteristics of the theoretical framework. The 
findings presented in this chapter will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
6.1 Case Descriptions 
 
The study consists of five cases that are described below. The case descriptions focus on 
describing the overall situation in the portfolio firms, i.e. the cases, during the private 
equity investment period. In other words, these case descriptions are intended to explore 
each case as within-case analysis as well as to “set the scene” for the findings and 
discussions following this section. The case descriptions also analyze the acquisition 
activity in each case to give an understanding of the acquisitions that took place in each 
case. 
 
The cases are divided into two: the three cases with high M&A activity (both prior 
and during the private equity investment) are described first. Then, the last two cases, 
where M&A activity has been less frequent, are described. In addition, it is worth to 
note that some of the case companies described here have been invested in by a 
different private equity firm in the past. For the purposes of this thesis, however, the 
study focuses on the actions taken only during the investment period of the interviewed 
private equity firm, and that is where the focus of the case descriptions is as well. Figure 
6 illustrates the investment period of each case. From the figure, we can see that each 
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case is quite recent, and Case 4 is still an ongoing investment. The figure also shows 
that the cases overlapped each other partly, thus they were also operating in similar 
overall economic conditions. In the case descriptions, the timeline for each case is 
presented to illustrate in more detail the acquisitions that happened during the 
investment period.  
 
Figure 6 - Timing of the Five Cases 
 
Case companies with high M&A activity 
 
Case 1 - HealthCo 1 
 
In 2014, a Nordic private equity firm that invests in mid-market firms invested in 
HealthCo 1. After following the HealthCo 1 for years, the time was right, and the 
private equity firm in question chose to delist HealthCo 1 from Nasdaq Helsinki. After 
nine months of delisting process, the private equity firm acquired a majority ownership 
in HealthCo 1 in June 2014. At the time of delisting, HealthCo 1 was, although fairly 
small (see Table 5), still a major player in its very fragmented (over 1 200 players in 
Finland) market. The market itself was seen by the private equity firm as stable and 
growing. 
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Table 5 - Case Companies During the Investment Period 
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These market characteristics, which provided opportunity for market 
consolidation and the leader position, formed a good basis for the investment. In 
addition, the private equity firm evaluated the management team and the overall 
organization to be in a good shape. The goals for the investment period were set: to 
grow HealthCo 1 above 100 million euros in sales and become the leading firm in 
Finland. The means for achieving the goals were also decided on: value creation 
organically through, for example, investing in new services and new digitalization 
enabled tools, as well as through improving margins. In addition, the private equity 
investor also included inorganic growth in the plans. Acquisitions were seen as a good 
way to create value and were used for geographic expansion, industry consolidation, 
adding new services, and improving utilization, to mention a few. HealthCo 1 had 
acquisition experience also before the investment period, which in part allowed for an 
efficient use of acquisitions. 
 
The acquisitions were frequently used during the investment period, from the 
beginning until the very end of it. Figure 7 illustrates the timeline of the investment and 
the small circles show the timing of the individual acquisitions. HealthCo 1 totaled 
approximately 45 acquisitions during the investment period, according to the 
interviewee. The data in stored Zephyr, the international database for mergers and 
acquisitions, show a somewhat smaller amount, 27 (see Table 6). Considering that the 
private equity firm exited HealthCo 1 in October 2017, a slightly over three years after 
the beginning of the investment, HealthCo surpassed by far the definition of serial 
acquirer (2-4 acquisitions in three years) described in the literature review. The 
acquisitions varied in size, ranging from small clinics of two to three employees to a 
large acquisition of 7 million in sales.  
 
The private equity firm in question exited HealthCo 1 in October 2017 by selling 
HealthCo 1 to an industrial buyer. At the time of the sale, HealthCo 1 had 
approximately 100 million euros in turnover, which meant that the size-related goal of 
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the private equity firm was achieved. HealthCo 1 has kept acquiring even after the exit 
by the private equity firm. 
 
 
Figure 7 - Timeline of Case 1 
 
 
Case 2 - HealthCo 2 
 
The private equity firm that invested in HealthCo 2 operates in Finland and invests in 
small and medium sized (10-100 million euros in turnover) Finnish companies. The 
private equity firm invested in HealthCo 2 in December 2009, when it acquired a 
majority ownership in HealthCo 2. HealthCo 2 was found interesting by the private 
equity firm, as it was a firm that had a distinctively own way of operating that stood out 
from the other firms in the market. In addition, one of the appealing aspects in HealthCo 
2 was the highly entrepreneurial CEO. HealthCo 2 fitted the investment strategy of the 
private equity firm in other ways too, thus the investment was seen as a good one. At 
the time of the investment HealthCo 2 was quite small company with only 20 million 
euros in turnover and smallest of the case firms (compared to the size at the beginning 
of the investment), although it grew tenfold during the investment period (see Table 5). 
 
The growth of HealthCo 2 was fueled by both organic and inorganic growth. 
Organic growth stemmed from developing and boosting new lines of services that were 
still smaller in the beginning of the investment. To boost the market position of 
HealthCo 2, also acquisitions were used as a form of inorganic growth. HealthCo 2 
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performed approximately 30 acquisitions, according to the interviewee, during the 
investment period, varying from smaller ones to one notably larger one with 
approximately 16 million euros of turnover at the time of the acquisition. Zephyr reports 
20 acquisitions for HealthCo 2 (see Table 6). The acquisitions are shown in Figure 8, 
which illustrates that the use of acquisitions started after the first two years of the 
investment, and continued after the investment period as well.  
 
Table 6 - Acquisitions by the Case Companies 
Case Reported 
number 
(approx.) 
Zephyr 
number 
Previous acquisition 
experience 
Motivations for 
acquisitions 
1 45 27 Acquisition-led strategy 
in the past 
Geographical 
expansion, industry 
consolidation, 
improving utilization, 
new services 
2 30 20 Acquisition experience 
before the investment 
Geographical 
expansion, new 
services 
3 20 11 Acquisition experience 
before the investment, a 
collation of over 150 
acquisitions 
Geographical 
expansion, industry 
roll-up, new services 
4 5 4 Bought back its 
franchised stores in the 
past, one "foothold 
acquisition" under 
previous PE 
Geographical 
expansion, building 
internal capability 
5 3 + a few 
small 
acquisitions 
5 Some acquisitions at the 
early stage of the 
company, none near the 
PE investment 
New services, new 
business locations 
 
HealthCo 2 was exited by the private equity firm in May 2016 after HealthCo 2 
was publicly listed in the Nasdaq Helsinki in June 2015. The investment period thus 
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lasted approximately six and a half years. At the time of the investment HealthCo had 
grown to approximately 210 million euros in turnover. 
 
Figure 8 - Timeline of Case 2 
 
 
Case 3 - HealthCo 3 
 
HealthCo 3 was invested in by a Swedish private equity firm that also has strong 
presence in Finland, as a part of its global presence. The private equity firm in question 
invests in portfolio firms that benefit from underlying large trends in the markets, and 
target firms tend to be either leaders or second largest in their respective markets. In 
December 2013, the private equity firm acquired HealthCo 3 from another private 
equity firm. At that time, HealthCo was among the two leaders in the market, sized at 
approximately 300 million euros in turnover making it the largest of the case companies 
(see Table 5). The underlying trends that HealthCo 3 was seen to benefit from included 
the aging population, the willingness to invest in healthcare, and efficient occupational 
healthcare. In addition, the private healthcare section was seen to grow, and HealthCo 3 
was evaluated to be a high-quality provider of services. 
 
The goals set by the private equity firm to HealthCo 3 included investments to 
digitalization, improving the efficiency of the medical staff, as well as boosting the 
effectiveness of the business model. In addition, HealthCo 3 grew geographically by 
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opening new offices, but also by acquiring existing businesses especially in those 
locations where their standing was not as strong. During the private equity investment 
period, HealthCo 3 completed reportedly approximately 20 acquisitions of varying 
sizes. As shown in Table 6, according to Zephyr the total number of acquisitions is 11. 
Out of the acquisitions, one especially was a larger one (approximately 130 million 
euros in sales). The timeline of HealthCo 3 and its acquisitions are shown in Figure 9. 
From that, it is possible to see that the acquisitions were executed in collations across 
the investment period, although the first year of the investment period did not have any 
acquisitions. Noteworthy is that HealthCo 3 has been an active acquirer also before the 
investment and was at the time of the interview a collation of approximately 155 
acquisitions, according to the interviewee. 
 
 
Figure 9 - Timeline of Case 3 
 
At the time of the interview, the private equity firm was still an owner of 
HealthCo 3, although HealthCo 3 was already listed in Nasdaq Helsinki. However, after 
the interview, the private equity firm has sold its shares and thus exited HealthCo 3. The 
length of the investment period totals to approximately 4 and a half years, concluding 
HealthCo 3 also as a serial acquirer (as defined by in the literature review). At the time 
of the exit, HealthCo 3 had turnover of approximately 690 million euros after over 
doubling the turnover during the investment period. 
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Case companies with less frequent M&A activity 
 
Case 4 - RetailCo 
 
RetailCo is the only one, out of the five case companies, where the private equity firm 
has not made its exit yet. The private equity firm is the same Swedish one that also 
invested in HealthCo 3. During the summer of 2014, the private equity firm started 
working on the acquisition, and in December 2014, the private equity firm acquired a 
majority ownership of RetailCo from another private equity firm (see Table 5). The 
previous private equity firm retained a minority ownership in RetailCo. At the time of 
the acquisition, RetailCo was a leader in its Finnish market. RetailCo was seen as an 
attractive investment, in addition to its market position, as the underlying market was 
growing due to changing consumer behavior. On the other hand, the private equity firm 
had previous experience both in retail and in the market itself. 
 
The goal or RetailCo was clear: to become the leader of its market in the Nordics. 
Acquisitions played significant part of this geographical expansion from the very 
beginning. RetailCo had a little previous experience with acquisitions before the 
investment, but the private equity firm brought acquisitions to RetailCo from the 
beginning. When the private equity firm was still negotiating the investment in 
RetailCo, it also simultaneously negotiated with a Swedish player that would then be 
acquired by RetailCo at the beginning of the investment period. In addition to this quite 
significant acquisition, RetailCo acquired another company in Sweden, as well as 
smaller companies to strengthen its online store related capabilities. According to 
Zephyr, the total amount of acquisitions was four (see Table 6). The timing of the 
acquisitions can be found in Figure 10, which illustrates how the first acquisitions were 
in the beginning of the investment period, and the rest two years later. In addition to the 
acquisition, RetailCo also grew organically and improved its operations, for example 
related to IT systems, warehousing, and digitalization.  
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Figure 10 - Timeline of Case 4 
 
As the investment is still ongoing, it is possible that RetailCo will engage in more 
acquisitions, with potentially different motives or sizes. However, for the purposes of 
this thesis, the focus is on the acquisitions RetailCo had already done by the time of the 
interview (September 2018). Thus, the focus is on the first four years of the investment 
period. Since the interview, there has been no announcement of an exit, although 
Zephyr reported rumors of potential exit in June 2018. 
 
Case 5 - FoodCo 
 
The private equity firm in this case is a Finnish private equity firm that invests in 
Finnish and Swedish firms with approximately 10-200 million euros in turnover. The 
private equity firm invested in FoodCo in December 2011, which was then 
approximately 60 million euros in turnover (see Table 5). Before the investment, 
FoodCo was a family owned business that lacked an heir, someone to continue the 
business in the families that owned it. This meant that the company was at a crossroads 
and in a need of a transformation into a non-family owned business. Although the 
market FoodCo operates in was a somewhat unusual for private equity investment, the 
private equity firm evaluated FoodCo to be an interesting company with growth 
potential in its market.  
 
  51  
 
At the time of the investment, FoodCo operated two separate businesses. For both, 
the use of acquisitions was seen as feasible choice. However, after a failed attempt to 
build the other one with an acquisition, it was decided that that line of business would 
be divested. The remaining business was, however, successfully expanded into a new 
market segment with the use of two acquisitions. FoodCo also attempted to grow in the 
new market segment by building its own business concepts, but unfortunately that plan 
did not work out as planned and was terminated. In addition to building a new line of 
business, FoodCo’s “old” business was expanded with a few acquisitions as well. The 
total amount of acquisitions for FoodCo, according to Zephyr, was five (see Table 
6).  The acquisitions concentrated mainly to the first two and three years of the 
investment period, although at least one acquisition was completed later on. See the 
timeline of the acquisitions in Figure 11. Due to the background in family ownership, 
the growth of FoodCo was also supported by other actions as well, such as improving 
the organization and changing management.  
 
 
Figure 11 - Timeline of Case 5 
 
FoodCo was exited in July 2018 by the private equity firm and FoodCo was sold 
to an industrial buyer. In total, the investment period by the private equity firm lasted 
approximately seven and a half years. At the time of the exit FoodCo had grown to 
approximately 105 million euros in turnover. 
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6.2 Characteristics of Acquisition Planning  
 
This section explores what the acquisition planning by the private equity investors looks 
like in the different cases. The analysis leans on the M&A planning side of the 
theoretical framework presented in Chapter 4. On the focus of this section is the six 
characteristics, as identified in Chapter 3, which are used to describe the different types 
of planning in acquisitions. The six elements are Link to Strategy, M&A motives, 
Timing, and Evaluation Criteria, Integration Planning and Role of Private Equity 
Investor.  
 
6.2.1 Link to Strategy 
 
Common to all of the cases in this study, the private equity investors had created a plan 
for the company of the things they wished to achieve during the investment period. This 
plan had different names depending on the private equity firm; it was called by the 
interviewees, for example, a value creation plan (HealthCo 1, HealthCo 3) or a business 
plan (RetailCo). Regardless what the name was, the plans were made prior to the 
beginning of the investment. As the interviewee for HealthCo 3 describes the purpose of 
the plan: 
 
“The day you become an owner, you have a vision of what needs to be done to the 
company. An ownership strategy, or as we call it, a value creation strategy. And it 
varies depending on the company.” 
 
The plans included a clear direction for the portfolio firm, for at least the duration 
of the private equity investment, giving the portfolio firms overall strategic goals. For 
example, the goal for RetailCo was to become a market leader in the Nordics. FoodCo 
aspired to add a new market to its product portfolio. For HealthCo 3, the goal was to 
  53  
 
grow the company and become the leader in the Finnish market. The different 
aspirations for the portfolio firms are described in above in the case descriptions. As 
described by the interviewee for HealthCo 3, these goals were also translated into 
quantifiable measures that private equity firm could then follow throughout the 
investment.  
 
If known at the time of the creation of the plan, the use of acquisitions was listed 
to the plans. The acquisitions could be listed as goals that were to be achieved with the 
acquisitions, for example, in the case of HealthCo 3 this meant listing the amount of 
sales and operating profit they targeted to gain though the acquisitions. HealthCo 1 
listed how many acquisitions they wished to complete during the investment. For 
HealthCo 2, the specific acquisitions were not known yet at the beginning of the 
investment period, but the plan mentioned they would be used. For RetailCo, instead, 
the investment began with an acquisition, thus the target for the first acquisition was 
known from the beginning. Moreover, in the case of FoodCo, it was clear that 
acquisitions would be used to achieve its goal of entering a new line of business.  
 
In each case, however, there were acquisitions that appeared more or less by 
chance, thus not all of the acquisitions were listed in the plans made at the beginning of 
the investment. The plans included broad plans and goals for the companies, not 
necessarily the names of the companies that were targeted later on in the investment 
period. This was common across the cases, unless the acquisition was close to the 
beginning of the investment period, the exact company would not be named. For 
example, in the case of HealthCo 2, even the largest acquisition they completed was not 
in the initial plans. 
 
The popularity of acquisitions was apparent in the interviews with the private 
equity investors. Acquisitions, for example, were apprised as one of the most important 
components for growth by the interviewee for HealthCo 2. One of the appeals of 
acquisitions was, according to interviewee for HealthCo 3 the convenience: it was easier 
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and faster to buy as the customers were already there and there were no need to, for 
example, build new offices as the targets had established business locations. FoodCo 
actually tried to build a new concept from scratch. However, that did not work out, and 
it became clear that, by acquiring, it is possible to get concepts that are already tested 
and working. Those concepts could then be scaled up within the company. Nonetheless, 
it was typical that acquisitions would be used in the portfolio companies, as described 
by the interviewee for FoodCo: 
 
“The use of acquisitions is always certain. Or that… It is without exception in our 
investment cases that we investigate the opportunities for M&A.“ 
 
Table 7 combines the findings from this section with the literature on private 
equity and mergers and acquisitions. The empirical findings point out that the private 
equity investors have clear goals for the portfolio firms. The plans and goals were laid 
out at the beginning of the investment and the use of acquisitions was also included in 
these plans. Comparing these findings to the theoretical framework it seems that the 
planning reminds Strategic Planners, arguably even Acquisition Program Planners since 
there was a clear strategic goal that the acquisition was linked to. The findings also 
support the assumptions arising from the private equity literature. 
 
Table 7 - Summary of Link to Strategy 
Planning 
Characteristics 
M&A Literature Private Equity 
Literature 
Empirical Findings 
Link to Strategy Non-Planners: Little to no 
link to strategy 
Strategic Planners: M&A 
objectives are compared to 
the strategy 
Acquisition program 
planners: A collection of 
M&As to achieve a strategy 
driven goal 
Portfolio firms need 
to have clear 
direction to generate 
returns. Seems 
plausible that the use 
of M&As is 
considered in this 
context, although 
there is little about 
the topic in literature. 
Clear strategic 
direction for the 
investment period. 
The use of M&As 
linked to this through 
value creation plans 
that are made at the 
beginning of the 
investment. 
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6.2.2 M&A Motives 
 
As the strategic goals for the portfolio firms varied case by case, so did the mix of 
motives for using acquisitions. However, there were common motives as well. In one 
way or another, geographical expansion was present each case’s acquisition rationales. 
In RetailCo, the expansion to Sweden through acquisitions was an essential part of the 
goals for the investment period. In the cases of HealthCo 1 and 3 acquisitions were 
targeted to the geographical areas where these companies were not yet present. In 
HealthCo 2, the geographical expansion helped it to gain foothold in the capital region, 
whereas in FoodCo the acquisitions took the company’s presence to outside of the 
capital region. Expansion to new business areas or adding new services were also 
among the motives in the case companies. For example, FoodCo, HealthCo 2, and 
HealthCo 3 all had entered a new line of business during the investment period. The 
additions, however, were not very far from the existing business. Other motivations for 
acquisitions included building an internal capability (RetailCo), improving utilization 
(HealthCo 1), and boosting the growth of the existing business by acquiring new 
companies to the existing business (HealthCo 1, 2, 3 and FoodCo).  
 
Interestingly, the private equity investors had their own way to categorize the 
different acquisitions their portfolio firms performed. The interviewees for RetailCo and 
FoodCo even explicitly made the division between impactful and less impactful 
acquisitions by describing the two broad categories: transformative acquisitions and 
non-transformative acquisitions.  
 
“There was an opportunity to do strategically transformative and/or larger 
acquisitions. And, on the other hand… To do, to boost the [organic] growth of the 
business, smaller acquisitions.” (FoodCo) 
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Transformative acquisitions were those acquisitions that were in some way 
significant to the portfolio firm. In the case of RetailCo, for example, the first 
acquisition was seen as transformative: it was large in size and created a major foothold 
in a geographical area, Sweden. Then on the other hand, in the case of FoodCo, the 
transformative acquisition was quite small in size (although later on scaled up to 
become larger), but it was the first service of its kind to the company, and served as a 
platform to other acquisitions in that market, opening up a new line of business for the 
company. In each of the HealthCo cases, there was also a large acquisition: HealthCo 1 
bought a competitor, HealthCo 2 bought a company through which it got a strong 
position in the capital region, and HealthCo 3 bought a major competitor.  
 
The non-transformative acquisitions were those acquisitions that, from the 
perspective of the private equity investor, were more minor, either by size or by its 
impact to the company. For example, in the cases of all of the HealthCo’s, they all 
performed a continuous stream of acquisitions and a big share of them where non-
transformative. The main driver for these kinds of acquisitions seems to be growth: they 
tended to be so small that the private equity investors almost did not consider them as 
“real” acquisitions, but more like organic growth (see also the FoodCo quote above). 
This is illustrated by these two quotes: 
 
“The sizes of these companies varied quite a lot, so there was almost like… You could 
say that these smaller ones were more like recruitment, when there are two to three 
[employees] it’s not a huge acquisition.” (HealthCo 1) 
 
“Single [offices], business locations… They are on the borderline whether they are 
acquisitions or more like you take over an operation and pay some key money to 
someone for it” (FoodCo) 
 
Considering these findings, the motives used in the acquisitions by the portfolio 
firms were strategic, thus the planning can be seen to remind either Strategic Planners or 
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Acquisition Program Planners (see Table 8). However, the division between the 
transformative and non-transformative acquisitions seems like a central insight but is 
not emphasized by either the literature on M&A planning or private equity.  
 
Table 8 - Summary of M&A Motives 
Planning 
Characteristics 
M&A Literature Private Equity 
Literature 
Empirical Findings 
M&A Motives Non-Planners: Personal & 
Political goals 
Strategic Planners: 
Multitude of potential 
motives 
Acquisition Program 
Planners: Similar to 
Strategic Planners 
Not explored in the 
literature. Possibly 
linked to the ways 
PE investors strive to 
create value. 
The M&A motives 
can be divided into 
two categories, 
transformative and 
non-transformative 
ones, by their impact 
to the portfolio firm.  
 
 
6.2.3 Timing 
 
The frequent acquirers held up a fairly brisk pace in their acquisitions, and they did not 
“stop” acquiring. The interviewee for HealthCo 2 described that as long as there are 
sensible opportunities, the acquisition activity would continue. The interviewee for 
HealthCo 1 told that the acquisitions were a “continuous effort”. In the case of 
HealthCo 3, they actually acquired more than was initially planned as the market 
conditions were favorable for acquisitions. Of course, it is worth to note that these 
companies had been acquiring companies before the investment also (see case 
descriptions in Section 6.1) thus, they had the structures and skills to keep up the active 
acquiring. For the less frequent acquirers there were naturally longer pauses between the 
acquisitions for the mere reason that they performed less of them.  
 
For some of the individual acquisitions, particularly the smaller ones performed 
by the frequent acquirers, the timing seemed somewhat sporadic and opportunity driven. 
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Especially for HealthCo 1 and HealthCo 3 there was a many potential acquisition 
targets available due to their markets being fragmented and because of the challenges 
faced by the target companies. This led to the target companies’ owners being highly 
willing to sell their companies or even drove them to contact the portfolio companies in 
the hopes they would be willing to buy the companies. As the interviewee for HealthCo 
3 illustrates: 
 
“The rise of digitalization and the growth of pressure created by digitalization were 
large drivers there… There were plenty of willing sellers. We were not always the first 
[proposing a sale], but some people came to us at [HealthCo 3] and wanted to [sell 
their company].” 
 
However, even in these cases, the acquisitions were evaluated against the criteria 
presented in the next section (Section 6.2.4), and thus not did significantly differ from 
the other acquisitions the firms performed. 
 
Interestingly, the acquisitions did not seem to take place during a specific time in 
the investment period. Even the larger and transformative acquisitions were spread out 
across the investment periods (see the timelines in Section 6.1): for RetailCo it was right 
in the beginning of the investment period, for FoodCo about three years into the 
investment, and for HealthCo 3 the acquisition was accepted by the authorities in March 
2017. In October 2017, HealthCo 3 became a publicly traded company, and in June 
2018, the private equity firm exited HealthCo 3. The interviewees for RetailCo and 
HealthCo 3 admitted that it would be nice to complete the acquisitions early on, but that 
especially the smaller ones do not really “rock the boat”, i.e. it makes little difference 
when they are completed. Nevertheless, the interviewee for RetailCo claimed, the 
companies are developed with a longer time period in mind than that of the investment 
period, and if it the acquisition is beneficial to the portfolio firm and fits the criteria, it 
will be likely executed even if the investment period is at its end. Both the interviewee 
for HealthCo 3 and for RetailCo mentioned that when the acquisitions are close to the 
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end of the investment period, they just need to be part of the story, of the sales pitch that 
is told to the potential next owners to highlight the benefits of them. The interviewee for 
RetailCo acknowledged that acquisitions in the end of the investment period would 
require extra explaining in when the private equity firm is seeking new owners but 
would not hinder from acquiring.  
 
The timing is where the differences between the previous literature and the 
empirical findings are clear. The literature on private equity presents that the 
acquisitions are typically performed in the first years of the investment period (see 
Table 9). However, as illustrated above and in the case timelines in Section 6.1, the 
acquisitions in some of the portfolio firms took place after the first years as well, 
sometimes right at the end of the investment. Determining what kind of planner is the 
most fitting is not as clear. Strategic Planner fits for the most part of the cases, but some 
of the individual acquisitions were close to Non-Planners as well. Table 9 summarizes 
these findings and adds them to the theoretical framework. 
 
Table 9 - Summary of Timing of M&A 
Planning 
Characteristics 
M&A Literature Private Equity 
Literature 
Empirical Findings 
Timing of 
M&A 
Non-Planners: Sporadic, 
arise from opportunities 
Strategic Planners: When 
the best option compared to 
other strategic options 
Acquisition Program 
Planners: Driven by the 
goals and pace of the 
program 
In the first 1-3 years 
of the limited 
investment period to 
reap the benefits. 
Acquisitions were 
performed 
throughout the 
investment period, 
also near the end of 
it. 
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6.2.4 Evaluation Criteria 
 
The criteria used to evaluate the potential acquisitions seemed to vary from case to case, 
indicating that the criteria is adapted to fit the needs of the case firm in question. 
However, there were similarities between the cases as well: in each case, the evaluation 
criteria included both financial and non-financial criteria. These criteria were often laid 
out already in the investment plan created before the investment, and at least as is with 
the case of HealthCo 3, each acquisition needed to fit within these pre-set criteria.  
 
Out of the financial criteria, each interviewee mentioned valuation or pricing 
criteria as one of the measures they used to evaluate the potential targets. The price 
seemed to be often a deal-breaker - a price above the accepted level deterred from 
acquiring. For example, in the case of HealthCo 1, their acquisition plans changed as 
new competition arose during the investment period and drove up the acquisition prices. 
The competitors were willing to pay a higher price than HealthCo 1 for the potential 
targets, which meant that those companies were lost to the competition. On the other 
hand, the implications of competition for the acquisitions were possibly even larger for 
FoodCo. At the beginning of the investment period, FoodCo operated two loosely 
linked lines of business. However, as the planned, potentially transformative, 
acquisition for one of the businesses was lost due to too high price compared to 
perceived value, the whole business ended up being divested. Interestingly though, the 
private equity firm of HealthCo 2 has a philosophy that they do not, with their portfolio 
firms, participate in acquisitions where there are other companies competing for the 
deal. According to the interviewee, they rather negotiate directly with the potential 
target company to avoid the price competition.  
 
Other financial criteria that were used in the acquisitions included evaluation of 
the value creation, or synergy, potential of the target firm. These criteria were especially 
mentioned by interviewees of the frequent acquirers, whereas the interviewees of the 
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less frequent acquirers focused on other criteria. For example, in the case of HealthCo 3, 
in addition to the synergies related to buying and pricing, also operational synergies 
were considered. This meant evaluation of, for example, whether a clinic could be 
closed in an area where there were enough clinics.  
 
In addition to the financial criteria, a variety of non-financial criteria were used as 
well. For example, fit within the strategy was a criterion mentioned across the cases. In 
the case of RetailCo, the interviewee illustrated the significance of fit with the strategy: 
 
“The most important thing is that the acquisitions align with the strategy of the 
company.” 
 
Other non-financial criteria cited by the interviewees included, for example 
quality of the offered services (in HealthCo 1 and FoodCo), fit into the current offering 
of the portfolio firm (FoodCo), scaling potential (FoodCo), the people and culture in the 
target firms (HealthCo 1, FoodCo). The non-financial criteria were usually linked back 
to the strategy. For instance, in the case of RetailCo, the criteria applied to an 
acquisition of web store capabilities was linked back to the capabilities RetailCo was 
lacking. This then linked back to the goal of developing the web store and improving its 
sales. 
 
Interestingly, the same criteria did not necessarily apply to all of the acquisitions 
but depended on the type of the acquisition. In the case of FoodCo this difference is 
illustrated when the transformative and non-transformative acquisitions are compared. 
For the transformative cases especially the people, the target’s product concept, and 
scalability of the offering were emphasized. In the non-transformative acquisitions that 
supported the “old” business, some of the criteria seemed almost opposite. The people 
in the target firm was not as interesting - they would be changed or at least heavily 
developed. In addition, the business site and lease of it were interesting. Not all of the 
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criteria were different, however, as the target still needed to be interesting and the price 
needed to be right. 
 
The summary of empirical findings for evaluation criteria can be found in Table 
10. As we can see from the above, the used criteria tend to be a combination of financial 
and non-financial evaluation criteria, suggesting that planning on the evaluation criteria 
part reminds Strategic Planners or Acquisition Program Planners. Value creation was 
mentioned with the need for synergies, but also the fit with the company’s strategy was 
highlighted in the findings. It seems that the assumption made from the private equity 
literature was supported by these findings. 
 
Table 10 - Summary of Evaluation Criteria 
Planning 
Characteristics 
M&A Literature Private Equity 
Literature 
Empirical Findings 
Evaluation 
Criteria 
Non-Planners: Mainly 
financial 
Strategic Planners: 
Financial and strategic 
estimates in balance 
Acquisition Program 
Planners: Financial and 
strategic estimates in 
balance, fit within the 
program 
Little academic 
literature on the 
topic. Acquisitions 
are likely required to 
create value. 
Both financial and 
non-financial 
estimates used. 
Valuation and fit 
within the portfolio 
firm’s strategy 
emphasized. Criteria 
can also vary within 
the same portfolio 
firm. 
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6.2.5 Integration Planning 
 
During the interviews, the role of integration planning received little attention from the 
interviewees. In the cases that represented the frequent acquirers, the interviewees 
mentioned that integration was a responsibility of the portfolio companies and their 
internal teams. In the case of HealthCo 3, the interviewee noted that the integration was 
one of the competencies of HealthCo 3, that they had solid processes for it. None of the 
interviewees for HealthCo 1, 2, or 3 mentioned the role of integration planning in the 
pre-M&A phase.  
 
In the case of FoodCo, the interviewee did emphasize the role of integration 
planning. It was important for them to consider how the people would fit into the 
company, how the teams would work together, if it is possible that the people from the 
acquired team start to leave, and so on. The acquired team needed to be committed to 
work in the new combination, and thus human resources played an important role. 
Before the acquisition it was important to plan how the interpersonal relationships 
would be managed, how the changes to the acquired people would be handled, and what 
would their role be in the new organization. Due to these, it was important that there 
was enough time to become acquainted with the potential target before the acquisition.  
 
Thorough investigation and planning of the integration beforehand was important. 
One bad acquisition could have had a large impact to the success of the company by 
potentially affecting also the other acquisitions as well and consuming time that would 
have otherwise been used to something else. This is illustrated by the interviewee for 
FoodCo: 
 
“It is often like, with the integration… If you complete ten acquisitions, like in a buy-
and-build case, one rotten one can contaminate the others. If you for example pay too 
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much or a business risk is realized then you just withstand it. But, if the integration 
fails, it can cause so much headache and it is so time consuming.” (FoodCo) 
 
The importance of integration planning, although highlighted in the literature on 
M&A planning (see Table 11), seems to be out of the scope of the interests of the 
private equity investors as only one interviewee highlighted the importance of it. The 
findings described above do not seem sufficient to say much on the topic, although if 
one looked only at the findings it would seem most of the interviewees represent Non-
Planners while one represented Strategic Planners or Acquisition Program Planners. 
 
Table 11 - Summary of Integration Planning 
Planning 
Characteristics 
M&A Literature Private Equity 
Literature 
Empirical Findings 
Integration 
Planning 
Non-Planners: Little to no 
integration planning 
Strategic Planners: 
Integration planning before 
the M&A transaction 
Acquisition Program 
Planners: Planned before 
each M&A transaction 
Not explored in the 
literature. 
Not much discussed 
by the private equity 
investors. Some 
trusted it the 
portfolio firms. One 
interviewee 
highlighted the 
importance of 
integration planning. 
 
 
6.2.6 Role of Private Equity Investor  
 
The role the private equity investors took in the M&A activity and the planning of it, 
was one of the aspects with distinctive differences between the frequent acquirers and 
less frequent acquirers. In the less frequent acquirer cases (RetailCo & FoodCo), the 
private equity investors participated in the acquisition process on many levels of 
management. In the case of RetailCo, the private equity firm actually orchestrated the 
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first acquisition, as it was already being planned and negotiated with the target company 
while the private equity firm was still negotiating the investment in RetailCo. As a 
result, the private equity firm had a more direct role in the M&A process than it had in 
some of the later acquisitions. In FoodCo, instead, the first acquisition was later on in 
the investment period, but the private equity investor was at least equally involved in 
the process. The private equity investor executed the whole acquisition by himself as 
there were a multitude of changes happening in the portfolio company, and the 
acquisition was deemed to be highly important for the company. This was typical for 
the private equity firm in question, considering that FoodCo was a family-owned 
company with very little experience in acquisitions: 
 
“When we go into a business, a case, that has entrepreneurial starting point, where the 
professional management still partly built and there has been no external investors or 
so, the experience with acquisitions is still low. Then we drive the acquisitions quite 
heavily, just like in this case. [In the beginning] we are very hands-on and execute them 
by ourselves.” 
 
Even though the private equity investors of FoodCo and RetailCo actively 
participated and worked hands-on in the first acquisitions, they emphasized that it was 
not in their interest to execute all of the acquisitions by themselves. Subsequently, the 
acquisitions after the first ones were, even in these less frequent cases, executed mainly 
by the operating management. The private equity investors adapted the role of a 
“sparring partner”. The companies had the leading responsibility, and the private equity 
investors supported them in the process on the boards of the companies by mainly 
directing the strategy and setting goals, instead of the hands-on work: 
 
“As we build the management and skills there, the learning is quite quick, and it gets to 
[to the point] where we steer the strategy. And we participate [in a more focused 
manner] in moments or help with more technical things, or with valuation of course. It 
becomes more like the work on the board of directors.” (FoodCo) 
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In the frequent acquirers (HealthCo 1, 2 & 3), the companies had strong internal 
competencies for acquisitions. The companies had, for example, M&A directors or 
other dedicated people, internal M&A teams or committees, as well as other supporting 
staff. In these cases, the portfolio companies had already established processes for the 
acquisitions and the companies executed the bulk of the acquisitions by themselves, 
especially the smaller ones. Thus, the role of the private equity investor was mainly to 
guide the M&A activity by improving the process and by setting goals and criteria that 
the targets needed to meet. In addition, at least in the case of HealthCo 1, the private 
equity investor tended to focus on supporting the finance side of acquisitions, ensuring 
that there were enough money for the acquisitions. Much of this work happened on the 
boards of the companies, where each acquisition had to be accepted, as described by the 
interviewee for HealthCo 3: 
 
“The board decides on them in the end, and through that you can influence the 
valuation, the way of doing, and you can professionalize the process.” 
 
Interestingly though, even in the frequent acquirer cases, the private equity 
investors were especially active and involved in the M&A process in one type of 
acquisitions: the transformative ones. Although they emphasized that they wanted the 
portfolio firm to execute most of the acquisitions by themselves, as the companies were 
highly capable, the transformative acquisitions were too important to let the companies 
to handle them. In these transformative acquisitions, the private equity investors tended 
to be more hands on in their participation. For example, in the case of HealthCo 3, the 
private equity investor took actively part of the negotiations, discussing with the target 
company and its chairperson of the board about what the potential combination could 
look like. As the target company’s owners would become later partial owners in 
HealthCo 3, the discussions were not solely focused on the planning of the acquisition. 
Instead, the private equity investor also spent time in these discussions selling the 
private equity firm as an owner and their plans for the combined company. In addition 
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to negotiations, the private equity investors would, for example, take the lead of 
process, seek potential targets, coordinate the due diligence, discuss and analyze. 
According to the interviewee of RetailCo this was often due to the fact that especially 
the larger acquisitions required additional monetary investment in the company, and the 
private equity investors usually coordinated that.  
 
 When it comes to contributing missing skills to the portfolio companies, the 
private equity investors tended to consider it possible in the area of acquisitions. In the 
cases of frequent acquirers, there was less need for it, as the portfolio firms already had 
strong competences in acquisitions. Nevertheless, even then the interviewee of 
HealthCo 3 said that acquisitions are the one area were private equity investors could be 
more involved, considering that the private equity firms do acquisitions regularly to 
acquire the portfolio firms. In the less frequent acquirers, the transfer of knowledge and 
skills seemed to be more concrete. In FoodCo, for example, as the company had very 
little knowledge of how to execute acquisitions: 
 
“Right away when we start to look into the first additional acquisition, we start to teach 
the managers who we know will be there in future as well... Yeah, we try to pour the 
knowledge to them.” (FoodCo) 
 
“A benefit of this is that the issues that come to the board are substantially better 
prepared. We have gone over the certain ways of doing things, and it is risk 
management of course too. Then you can better trust it, you have trained others to look 
over certain things and the [due diligence] has been done with a certain approach, the 
figures have been calculated in a specific way, and so on.” (FoodCo) 
 
To RetailCo, the one way the private equity investor brought their knowledge to 
the company was by shaping the “mindset” of the portfolio company. To the private 
equity investor, one of the most important things they brought to the company was the 
way of thinking, where the goals are clear and the acquisitions are compared against 
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these goals. The private equity investor also saw that with their influence the portfolio 
company has got the courage to take more risks.  
 
    By looking at the findings above, it seems that the role of the private equity 
investors does vary quite much, depending on the predominant conditions, especially 
the acquisition experience and whether the acquisition is transformative or not. The role 
can be to oversee acquisitions on the board of the portfolio firm or to execute the 
acquisitions directly, or a something between the two. The previous literature has not 
explored this area much (see Table 12), thus these findings add new understanding to 
the field. 
 
Table 12 - Summary of Role of Private Equity Investor 
Planning 
Characteristics 
M&A Literature Private Equity 
Literature 
Empirical Findings 
Role of Private 
Equity Investor 
-- Typically active, but 
limited to working at 
board of the 
company. Can also 
execute M&As 
directly 
Level of 
participation 
depended on the 
portfolio firms’ 
M&A experience 
and whether the 
acquisition was 
transformative or 
not. 
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7 Discussion 
 
The findings point to an interesting result where all of the private equity investors 
studied here seem to act and influence the activities of their portfolio firms in similar 
ways, yet there is variance within the cases. The private equity investors do not steer 
and participate in all of the acquisitions in a same way, but seem to adapt their behavior 
depending on the acquisition. This is illustrated when the findings on the six planning 
characteristics are considered together. The combined theoretical framework, where the 
empirical findings are compiled and added from the previous chapter, is shown in Table 
13. 
 
7.1 Strategic Planner or Acquisition Program Planner? 
Considering the research question, the portfolio firms seem to resemble the 
Strategic Planners that were described in the literature review. By considering the link 
to strategy, it stands out from the findings that the private equity investors introduce a 
clear direction for the portfolio firms at the beginning of the investment, most likely due 
to the pressures of short investment period (see e.g. Metrick & Yasuda, 2011). The fact 
that the plan included, at least in the cases studied here, the acquisitions on some level 
suggests that the acquisitions are linked to the goals. This is similar to the behavior of 
Strategic Planners and Acquisition Program Planners. 
 
Interestingly, regarding the link to strategy, the private equity investors resemble 
the acquisition program planners quite much. As an acquisition program is a collation of 
acquisitions executed to achieve a certain goal (Keil et al., 2012), one might consider 
the overall investment goal as the acquisition program goal. By seeing it this way, all of 
the acquisitions executed during the investment period would be in an acquisition 
program. However, the investment plans did include other means as well, such as 
reorganizing the company (FoodCo) or investing in services (HealthCo 1), in addition to 
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the acquisitions. Considering those, the investment period is not solely an acquisition 
program, but a program combining acquisitions and other more organic methods for 
growth and improvement. It is an “extended” acquisition program in a sense, where 
acquisitions hold an important role, but are complemented with other means as well, 
and together they are used to achieve the same goal.  
 
Table 13 - Updated Theoretical Framework 
Planning 
Characteristics 
M&A Literature Private Equity 
Literature 
Empirical Findings 
Link to Strategy Non-Planners: Little to 
no link to strategy 
Strategic Planners: 
M&A objectives are 
compared to the strategy 
Acquisition program 
planners: A collection of 
M&As to achieve a 
strategy driven goal 
Portfolio firms 
need to have clear 
direction to 
generate returns. 
Seems plausible 
that the use of 
M&As is 
considered in this 
context, although 
there is little about 
the topic in 
literature. 
Clear strategic direction for 
the investment period. The use 
of M&As linked to this 
through value creation plans 
that are made at the beginning 
of the investment.  
M&A Motives Non-Planners: Personal 
& Political goals 
Strategic Planners: 
Multitude of potential 
motives 
Acquisition Program 
Planners: Similar to 
Strategic Planners 
Not explored in the 
literature. Possibly 
linked to the ways 
PE investors strive 
to create value. 
The M&A motives can be 
divided into two categories, 
transformative and non-
transformative ones, by their 
impact to the portfolio firm.  
Timing of 
M&A 
Non-Planners: Sporadic, 
arise from opportunities 
Strategic Planners: 
When the best option 
compared to other 
strategic options 
Acquisition Program 
Planners: Driven by the 
goals and pace of the 
program 
In the first 1-3 
years of the limited 
investment period 
to reap the benefits. 
Acquisitions were performed 
throughout the investment 
period, also near the end of it. 
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Evaluation 
Criteria 
Non-Planners: Mainly 
financial 
Strategic Planners: 
Financial and strategic 
estimates in balance 
Acquisition Program 
Planners: Financial and 
strategic estimates in 
balance, fit within the 
program 
Little academic 
literature on the 
topic. Acquisitions 
are likely required 
to create value. 
Both financial and non-
financial estimates used. 
Valuation and fit within the 
portfolio firm’s strategy 
emphasized. Criteria can also 
vary within the same portfolio 
firm. 
Integration 
Planning 
Non-Planners: Little to 
no integration planning 
Strategic Planners: 
Integration planning 
before the M&A 
transaction 
Acquisition Program 
Planners: Planned before 
each M&A transaction 
Not explored in the 
literature. 
Not much discussed by the 
private equity investors. Some 
trusted it  the portfolio firms. 
One interviewee highlighted 
the importance of integration 
planning. 
Role of Private 
Equity Investor 
-- Typically active, 
but limited to 
working at board of 
the company. Can 
also execute M&As 
directly 
Level of participation 
depended on the portfolio 
firms’ M&A experience and 
whether the acquisition was 
transformative or not. 
 
The popularity of acquisitions as presented, for example, by Hammer and 
colleagues (2012) is understandable from the comments by the interviewees in this 
study. The speed and convenience of acquisitions, described by the interviewees, seem 
to come in handy when the investment period is limited and the pressure for results is 
considerable. What is more, when compared against the definition of a serial acquirer 
(at least two to four acquisitions in three years) the frequent acquirers passed the mark 
with a wide margin. The frequent acquirers executed approximately 10-45 acquisitions 
in three years. Moreover, although the less-frequent acquirers were considered to be on 
the lower end on the scale when it comes to total number of acquisitions, even they 
surpassed the lower limit of two acquisition in three years. This suggests that the typical 
M&A measures and thresholds used on non-private equity backed companies might not 
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be sufficient for the private equity portfolio firms, but should rather take into account 
also the brisk pace of the private equity investment periods. 
 
The motives for the individual acquisitions seem to be quite directly linked to the 
goals of the investment period. If a case company wanted to become a Nordic player, it 
acquired a company from the Nordic Market. Alternatively, if a company wanted to 
expand its service offering, it would acquire companies that operated in that business 
area. However, the acquisitions were used for different goals within the portfolio firms, 
which fits Strategic Planners better than Acquisition Program Planners that tend to use 
acquisitions to achieve a specific goal. None of the interviewees mentioned any non-
strategic goals, possibly due to the fact that private equity investors tend to also 
implement governance structures to their portfolio companies (see e.g. Barber & Goold, 
2007, Wood & Wright, 2009).  
 
However, the acquisitions seem to have almost a double-layer of motives - the 
strategic motivation, which then is motivated by the private equity investors’ own goals 
of creating value and generating results. It could be reasoned that the acquisitions would 
need to fit the private equity investors’ motives, in addition to the portfolio firms’ 
motives. In order for the private equity model to work and for private equity investors to 
be able to create value in the portfolio firms, the motives would however need to be 
aligned for the most part (see e.g. Moon, 2006). Yet, it almost seems that when it comes 
to the acquisitions, the private equity investors’ motives may be stronger than those of 
the portfolio firm. This is visible especially in the small non-transformative acquisitions 
that even the private equity investors considered less significant, more like recruitment 
or taking over an operation. It seems possible that these acquisitions were mainly driven 
by the need for growth, although to more research is needed to support this. This poises 
an interesting question about the nature of the private equity investor’s motives. 
Although they might not necessarily be non-strategic or otherwise value destructive, 
there is a possibility that the motives are not always aligned between the private equity 
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investors and the portfolio company. Will the motives of the private equity investor 
overrule in that case? 
 
The evaluation criteria used in the cases also fit the descriptions of Strategic 
Planners and Acquisition Program Planners. The private equity investors brought their 
own criteria for the acquisitions to the portfolio firms, and the criteria were a 
combination of financial and non-financial criteria. Interestingly, even though the 
private equity investors are investors after all, the financial estimates did not overpower 
in the criteria. Actually, the alignment with the strategy was emphasized by multiple 
interviewees, in addition to the financial criteria such as valuation. This supports 
Moon’s (2006) claim that the incentives need to be aligned so that the acquisitions are 
value-adding. Interestingly, the criteria did, however, vary between the acquisitions 
made by same portfolio firm, leading to the conclusion that the criteria was not always 
set in stone, but depends on the motives of the acquisition. 
 
The timing of the acquisitions executed in the portfolio firms studied here 
challenges the literature reviewed in Chapter 2. According to the literature, the 
acquisitions are performed early on in the investment period, typically in the first 1-3 
years and are likely delay the private equity firm’s exit if execution was made too late 
(Morkötter & Wetzer, 2015, Hammer et al., 2016). In the case firms, however the 
situation was different - the acquisitions were executed from the very beginning to the 
end of the investment period. HealthCo 3 even performed its transformative acquisition 
about one year before the exit by the private equity firm. It seems that, although the 
private equity investors would prefer to do the acquisitions early on, in reality they will 
keep acquiring if there are acquisitions that “make sense” and fit the criteria. 
Contradictory to the claim of delayed exit, the private equity investors did not 
necessarily seem to care if, for example, integration was still in progress or not all of the 
benefits were yet achieved, it merely meant that the private equity investors would need 
to “sell” the benefits of the acquisitions to the next potential owners. Furthermore, in the 
case of the frequent acquirers, it was considered almost odd if the company would stop 
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acquiring as they had acquisition-led strategies. From these insights it seems that the 
previous literature might not had considered different situations where the acquisitions 
can happen. One might even argue that, to complete all the right acquisitions in the first 
years, the private equity investors would need very good planning skills (and possibly 
good fortune) that even they might not have. By focusing only on acquiring in the first 
years, the private equity investors might miss opportunities that would have benefitted 
the portfolio firm but appeared “too late”. 
 
 When it comes to the integration planning, not many interviewees mentioned it. It 
seems that most of the integration is left to the portfolio firms to handle, and thus is not 
a major part of the planning either. Only in one of the cases was the integration and 
people management mentioned as an important pre-M&A step. In the specific case 
company (FoodCo), the businesses are quite dependent on the people running them, 
which could explain the need to pay attention to integration issues in the planning phase 
as well. It is unclear, however, what could explain the lack of focus on the integration 
planning in the other case companies. Could it be because even though private equity 
firms themselves acquire portfolio firms, they do not usually integrate them into the 
private equity firms and thus do not pay that much attention to integration matters? 
Alternatively, could it be because they did not consider integration as important as the 
other topics in the interviews? Whatever the reason may be, this area could benefit from 
additional research to provide answers. 
 
7.2 The Dynamic Role of Private Equity Investor 
 The private equity investors’ participation in the acquisitions seems to vary 
depending on the acquisition. The basic level of participation in each case was the work 
on the board level, setting goals, guiding the work, and approving acquisitions. In a 
majority of the acquisitions, the private equity investors participated in a way that was 
similar to this. But, the private equity investors did not shy away from hands-on work 
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either, they just did not consider it sensible in each acquisition. In the cases of frequent 
acquirers, these acquisitions were only the transformative ones, usually one per 
company. The private equity investors saw these acquisitions as highly important, and 
thus wanted to participate in them as well.  
 
To the less-frequent acquirers the hands-on acquisitions were the first ones, the 
ones where the private equity investors could also teach the portfolio firms how to do 
acquisitions. Learning in acquisitions is an area of research, but the focus has been on 
how the companies themselves learn from the acquisitions and the mechanisms of 
learning (see e.g. Aktas et al., 2013). Interestingly though, in these cases, in addition to 
the learning the portfolio firms gained by doing the acquisitions, the private equity 
investors actually taught the companies by guiding the management though the 
acquisition process. The set-up of this is intriguing - could it be unique to the private 
equity-portfolio firm interaction, or does similar learning happen in other contexts as 
well? Overall, the transfer of skills significantly affected the portfolio firms and their 
ability to execute acquisitions since after the first acquisition the private equity investors 
were able to step back and let the companies work on the acquisitions. This suited the 
private equity investors well since after that they could move on to other things and 
enjoy the results: acquisitions made according to their preferences. 
 
Given the above it could be concluded that the private equity investors tend to 
give the portfolio firms a strong direction for the investment period, and acquisitions are 
often a part of that direction. When acquisitions are used in the portfolio firms, they 
need to be value adding in the sense that they contribute to achieving the goals set by 
the private equity firm. To make sure that they do so, both motives and evaluation 
criteria are derived from the goals. The private equity investors ensure this by 
contributing actively in the work of the board, but also in the most important cases by 
participating more hands-on on the acquisitions through which they can also teach and 
influence the way the company executes the acquisitions. The role of the private equity 
investor seems to be quite dynamic when it comes to the acquisitions. 
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7.3 Transformative or Not? 
This division between the important and less important, or as the private equity 
investors tended to describe them, transformative and non-transformative acquisitions, 
seems quite an interesting way of looking at the private equity investors influence on 
the portfolio firms’ acquisition behavior. As described in the findings, the 
transformative acquisitions are a special case in acquisitions where the stakes are higher 
and the need to be successful is significant. The transformative acquisitions in the case 
firms were the ones that had a big impact on the direction of the company, for example 
by opening new geographical locations, adding new lines of business, or by increasing 
the firm’s market share notably. The private equity investors were much more involved, 
taking the lead to ensure the success and the resources needed for the acquisition. The 
role of the private equity investor was significant, even if the portfolio firm had already 
gained plenty of acquisition experience. The non-transformative acquisitions, on the 
other hand, seemed less important from the perspective of the private equity investors. 
They were smaller and easier for the companies to complete themselves, more like the 
normal way of the business. Nothing that required hand-on participation, aside from the 
typical overseeing role, from the private equity investors. Interestingly even Zephyr did 
not show all of the acquisitions, further highlighting the minor role of the smallest 
acquistions. 
 
This division of acquisitions into transformative and non-transformative 
acquisitions reminds of the logic applied by Christensen and colleagues (2011) who 
divided the acquisitions in two categories: the ones that improve the current business 
and the ones that reinvent the business model. Although, here the transformative 
acquisitions could be used to improve the current business and possibly only one of the 
acquisitions reinvented the business model in the way Christensen and colleagues 
(2011) meant it. However, considering who the interviewees were, there is a perspective 
from which the acquisitions were transformative: the private equity investors’ 
perspective. The portfolio firms were notably different after the transformative 
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acquisition compared to what they were like before the investment period. Some gained 
a significant market share and became a clear market leader (HealthCo 3), a new 
location that opened a new market (RetailCo), a new line of business and got a foothold 
in a completely new market segment (FoodCo), or whatever was the goal of the 
company. It shows that the acquisitions were a way for the private equity investors 
make an impact and create a change on a larger scale, to show that they transform the 
companies they invest in, thus validating their mandate as active owners. 
 
In each case company, there was only one genuinely transformative acquisition, 
no matter how much the case firm had previous acquisition experience or how many 
acquisitions it completed during the investment period. The number of the non-
transformative acquisitions, however, varied drastically case by case. The reasons for 
completing one transformative acquisition per case are unfortunately outside the scope 
of this study, although it would be interesting to know. Maybe the transformative 
acquisitions tell a compelling story to potential buyers at the time of the exit. 
Alternatively, maybe transformative acquisitions are a great way to show the firm’s 
ability to grow and take on challenges, both to internal and external audiences? 
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8 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, the starting position of the study is revisited. The goal is to answer the 
research questions with the findings that arise from the study to conclude the thesis. In 
addition, the theoretical contribution of the study is discussed, as well as the 
implications the managers and practitioners can benefit from. The chapter ends with 
discussion on the limitations of the study and offers areas for future studies on the 
research topic.   
 
8.1 Summary and Theoretical Contribution 
 
The starting position of this study was that private equity firms are important players, 
although they often operating in the “shadows” behind the companies they invest in. 
Understanding the ways in which they operate, from the perspective of management and 
strategy, benefits the academic field as well as the practitioners. 
 
Little research exists on the acquisitions performed by the portfolio firms making 
it an emerging area of research. The research that is already available, exists within the 
academic discipline of finance and tends to rely on quantitative methods. By applying 
qualitative methods and using the academic field of management and strategy as the 
complementary area of research, it is possible to help the field grow by providing 
insights that might be otherwise difficult to attain.  
 
The research question of this study is “How do the private equity investors plan 
the overall acquisition behavior of their portfolio firms?”. To answer the research 
questions the theoretical framework is built on literature on private equity and on 
planning the mergers and acquisitions. As a result, six different characteristics are 
identified and used to describe the acquisition planning in the portfolio firms: Link to 
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Strategy, M&A Motives, Timing of M&A, Evaluation Criteria, Integration Planning, 
and Role of Private Equity Investor. See Table 2 for full presentation of the theoretical 
framework. This framework is applied in the data collected from the five case 
companies, though interviews and other data available from public sources and 
databases.  
 
Overall, the study results indicate that the portfolio firms are strategic planners in 
their acquisitions. Private equity investors bring clear goals to the portfolio firms in the 
beginning of the investment, and acquisitions need to contribute to these goals. This 
ensured throughout the planning process, for example, the acquisition motives are 
linked to the overall goals, and the evaluation criteria includes the fit with the chosen 
strategy. The focused action in acquisitions was quite expected and fits within the 
assumptions laid out in the theoretical framework, thus it supports the observations 
made in the previous literature. 
 
The findings, however, contradict the timing of acquisitions as presented in the 
earlier research: in this study, the acquisitions spanned across the investment period, 
and even the important, transformative, acquisitions could be completed near the end. 
The focus on the first years arising from the previous literature did not apply in this 
study. As a result, the study offers an alternative finding to the body of literature. The 
results on the integration planning were not conclusive, it needs more research to be 
understood it better. However, it seems, from the findings of this study, that private 
equity investors can be only a little involved in integration planning, or they can see it 
as highly important.  
 
The roles of private equity investors varied depending on the acquisition 
experience of the portfolio firm. In those cases where the portfolio firm had little 
experience, the private equity investors were more involved in the beginning, teaching 
the managers to execute the acquisitions. After the first acquisitions, the private equity 
investors adopted a less hands-on approach where they would help in where needed and 
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focus on the work on the boards of the companies. For the experienced acquirers, the 
private equity investors skipped the teaching part, and moved directly to the overseeing 
role where they participated mainly on the board. This was similar to the assumptions 
from previous literature, although the findings contribute new understanding as the 
previous literature had not offered insights on which are the cases where private equity 
investors are more involved and in which the private equity investors remain in the 
overseeing role. 
 
One of the notable new insights generated by this study is the categorization 
between the acquisitions and the influence of this categorization to the participation of 
the private equity investors. The empirical findings illustrated how the private equity 
investors would view the acquisitions differently depending on whether or not the 
acquisitions were transformative or not. The non-transformative acquisitions were 
smaller in size, and some private equity investors did not even view all of them as 
acquisitions, but more like recruitment or as taking over an operation. These 
acquisitions were left to the portfolio firms to complete and manage. The motivations 
for at least some of the non-transformative acquisitions seemed almost be driven by 
private equity investors’ the need for growth and a larger company size.  
 
The transformative acquisitions were those that were perceived to have a large 
impact to the company, either by size or by other key attribute (e.g. it opened a new 
business line). Whether the acquisition was transformative or not, could be assessed 
from the perspective of a private equity investor: the transformative acquisitions were 
those that made the portfolio firm noticeably different from what it was in the beginning 
of the investment. In each case there were about one transformative acquisition, while 
the amount of non-transformative ones varied quite much in the case firms. In the 
transformative acquisitions, the private equity investors were quite involved in the 
M&A process, no matter whether or not the portfolio firm had previous acquisition 
experience. This was due to the importance of these kinds of acquisitions, in addition to 
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the fact that the acquisitions often required additional funds, which the private equity 
investors were often responsible for arranging.  
 
The importance of the division between the acquisitions, as observed in this study, 
is a finding that has not been brought up in the previous studies. There is some 
resemblance to some of the categorizations made in the more management and strategy-
oriented research on mergers and acquisitions, especially to that by Christensen and his 
colleagues (2011), but even that does not consider the dynamic role of the private equity 
investor. The insights on the transformative and non-transformative acquisitions expand 
the understanding on the types of acquisitions the portfolio firms face during the 
investment period and thus opens up a new potential area for research on private equity. 
In addition, the findings allow for more detailed qualitative and quantitative studies, 
since the previous studies have mainly considered all of the acquisitions as similar, with 
a noteworthy exception of Hammer et al. (2016). In addition, by understanding that the 
private equity investors adapt their role depending on the nature of the acquisition is a 
fundamental finding of this study. It is an insight that describes the ways private equity 
investors operate, and the dynamic role may be present in private equity investors’ other 
tasks as well. How dynamic is the role of private equity investor? 
 
8.2 Managerial Implications 
 
Although the main contributions of this study are theoretical, considering the newness 
of the field, there are implications for the practitioners of the field as well. For those 
firms facing an opportunity to work with private equity firms, the study offers insights 
that may be beneficial to the managers and owners of these firms. For example, 
understanding the ways private equity firms operate allows for better understanding on 
what kinds of changes may be in the future for the companies and what is their potential 
outlook when it comes to the acquisition activity. In addition, the study offers insights 
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what may be expected of the managers while the company is owned by a private equity 
fund. For example, they can expect to learn intensely about how to acquire companies 
as the private equity investors use the first acquisitions to teach the management, if the 
company has not been an active acquirer in the past. 
 
There are some insights arising from the study also for those companies for which 
the private equity firms’ involvement is not as likely or in the near future. These 
companies might benefit from the mindset of private equity investors. One of the key 
ideas the private equity investors brought to their portfolio firms was the focus on clear 
goals and the need for the actions be strictly aligned with these goals. This highly 
focused way to act could bring benefits to the companies that are not portfolio firms. 
The use of acquisition programs is quite close to this idea, although private equity 
investors used “expanded” acquisition programs where also other actions were taken in 
addition to buying companies. Moreover, to understand their own acquisitions and the 
opportunities for acquisitions, the logic of transformative and non-transformative 
acquisitions can be transferred to non-private equity backed companies as well: is the 
acquisition going to transform the company significantly from what it was or is it going 
to be minor one in the big picture? Maybe the level of involvement of the management 
should also depend on the impact of the acquisition? 
 
8.3 Limitations 
 
This study, like many others, is not without limitations. For one, the sources for the 
empirical data collected for the study were limited to that provided by the private equity 
side interviewees, in addition to data that was available from public sources and 
databases. Although there is a logic for using private equity investors as the 
interviewees (elaborated in more detail in Chapter 5), they can only offer a one-sided 
view to the topics explored in this study. The experiences and opinions from the 
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portfolio firm side, for example managers and board members, are unfortunately out of 
the scope of the study, although they could have offered additional insights leading to 
richer findings. The exclusion of the portfolio firms was a deliberate choice driven by 
the issues with access. As the access to the private equity investors was also somewhat 
limited, finding pairs of private equity investors and high-level decision-makers from 
the portfolio firms, in a market this small, would have likely required larger negotiations 
and, in the end, better personal contacts.  
 
The selected case companies also were selected based on their activity of 
acquisitions. In each case, there were acquisitions during the investment period. 
Although this was fitting for the research topic, it is noteworthy that this selection 
excludes companies that could have planned to use acquisitions, but for a some reason 
choose not to follow the plans. The selection of the case companies also excludes those 
companies that never even planned to use acquisitions. Although these companies 
would likely not have much to say about their acquisition planning practices, there are 
still underlying decisions and influences that could bring more insights into the study. 
Thus, this study is unable to say much about the companies that never did any 
acquisitions and the results should not be taken as anyway representative of all the 
private equity portfolio firms, but as a description of these selected five. 
 
Considering the geographical and temporal boundaries, the study is quite limited 
to a one place within a fairly limited time period. This may skew the insights in a sense 
that in another place or another time, the acquisitions could be planned differently or the 
private equity investors could adopt another kind of role in the acquisitions. This is 
good to keep in mind that while evaluating the findings of this study. 
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8.4 Suggestions for Future Research 
 
This study is only a brief exploration into the acquisitions made by the portfolio firms, 
and as the whole area of literature is still emerging, there are naturally plenty of 
potential areas for future research. This section will present some of the interesting ones 
from the perspective of this study. 
 
As this study focused on the planning process of the acquisitions, there are 
opportunities to dive into more detail about the different characteristics of panning. For 
example, considering Link to Strategy, the field could benefit from studies examining 
the first steps of planning. How are the value creation plans formulated? Alternatively, 
how and to what extent are the potential acquisitions predicted and planned? With the 
M&A Motivations it would be interesting to find out, for example, what is the division 
between transformative and non-transformative acquisitions on a larger scale. Do each 
portfolio firm have one transformative acquisition? With the Timing of the Acquisition, 
one especially interesting question left unanswered by this study is the stories and sales 
pitches the private equity investors use in the end of the investment period. How are the 
ongoing acquisitions included in these talks? The understanding on the Evaluation 
Criteria would benefit from insights on what is the spectrum of criteria used across 
different case firms. This study provided initial insights, but there are surely more than 
the ones reported here. The insights on Integration Planning from this study are still 
quite thin, and the field would benefit from a study dedicated to understanding the role 
of integration planning and the ways private equity firms perceive it. 
 
Finally, the roles of private equity investors were found to be dynamic in this 
study. This seems a potential new area for future studies. How do the portfolio firms 
perceive the role of the private equity investors? How dynamic is the role? In 
acquisition activity, the role seems to be quite dynamic, but how about other areas and 
activities the private equity firms participate in? In addition, a study on what drives the 
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dynamic participation could be insightful. What drives the private equity investors to be 
dynamic?  
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